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INTRODUCTION
Terrorist attacks on commercial aviation had declined significantly after
reaching a high point in the 1970s. The devastating consequences of the four
coordinated hijackings and deliberate crashes of three of the planes into the
World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., on
September 11, 2001—an event unprecedented in the annals of terrorism—have
wiped out all sense of progress and focused national attention on aviation
security. Meanwhile, terrorists have continued to attack public surface
transportation worldwide with no indication of abatement in these attacks.1
With large-scale indiscriminate violence clearly the reality of contemporary
terrorism and growing concerns that terrorists might use chemical and
biological weapons, to which public transportation systems are extremely
vulnerable, the threat has increased.
Surface transportation systems cannot be protected as easily as airplanes,
which are housed in fairly closed and reasonably controlled locations;
additionally, the airport terminal access to airplanes is controlled by relatively
few entry points. Conversely, trains, buses, and light rail systems must remain
readily accessible, convenient, and inexpensive for the traveling public.
There are other differences between surface and air transport. Unlike airplanes,
which make relatively few passenger transfers, trains and buses make
numerous stops along vast open and penetrable corridors. Passenger profiling,
passenger screening, and the elaborate deployments of metal detectors, X-ray
machines, explosives sniffers, hand searchers, and armed guards that have
become features of the passenger landscape at airports cannot be transferred
easily to subway stations, bus stops, or light rail platforms. The delays would
be enormous and the costs prohibitive. The same open targets that permit
penetration serve as easy conduits for escape by assailants. Surface
transportation lines, like power lines and pipelines, are extremely difficult to
protect.
Open to relatively easy penetration, trains, buses, and light rail systems offer
an array of vulnerable targets to terrorists who seek publicity, political
disruption, or high body counts. High concentrations of people in relatively
1 Terrorism can be defined as premeditated, politically motivated violence or deliberate threats
of violence against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually
intended to influence an audience. Terrorist attacks are, of course, crimes, but crime in the
context of this report refers to ordinary crimes such as murder, assault, extortion, etc.
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crowded quarters are inviting fodder for those who would cause mayhem and
death. The massive amounts of explosives needed for truck bombs are
unnecessary in crowded train stations, bus depots, carriages, or coaches. Even
without large numbers of casualties, disruptions to transit can seriously impact
a region’s economy and the public’s faith in the government’s ability to
provide basic protections to its citizens.
Such conditions do not mean that authorities are without tools of their own.
Transportation operators and security officials in areas that have been
subjected to terrorist attacks have developed some effective security
countermeasures. No security system can stop determined terrorists from
setting off bombs, biological weapons, or chemical reactions in public places.
Nevertheless, good security measures can make terrorist operations more
difficult, increase the terrorists’ likelihood of being detected and identified,
keep casualties and disruptions to a minimum, reduce panic, and reassure
alarmed passengers in a crisis.
ONGOING RESEARCH
For the past five years, the Mineta Transportation Institute at San José State
University has led a continuing research program focusing on the security of
public surface transportation against terrorist attacks and other serious violent
crimes. The effort began with a surface transportation terrorism symposium
held in 1996, which brought together security experts from transportation
entities, law enforcement, and other government agencies. Their discussions
were published by the Institute in Terrorism in Transportation—A Symposium
(San Jose: Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation
Policy Studies, March 1996).
The following year, the Mineta Institute launched a more formal research
program aimed at identifying the best security practices. The initial phase of
this effort included four case studies that reviewed transportation security
measures in Paris, Atlanta, New York, and on the Amtrak rail system. The Paris
case study focused on the immediate aftermath of the 1995 terrorist bombing
of a commuter rail station in Paris. The Atlanta case study examined the
security preparations connected with the 1996 Olympics and the aftermath of
the Centennial Park bombing. The Amtrak case study focused on the response
to the deliberate derailing of the Sunset Limited in November 1995. New York
was included because of the size and complexity of its system and the incidents
and threats that affected it in the 1990s, including the 1993 World Trade Center
Introduction
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bombing and the 1997 terrorist plot to carry out suicide bombings on the city’s
subways.
In addition to the case studies cited above, Phase I of the research reviewed the
security measures employed by nine other transportation systems in the United
States, ranging from small rural bus systems to larger multimodal operations.
A chronology and analysis of terrorist attacks on surface transport from 1920
to mid-1997 and an annotated bibliography completed the research effort. The
results of the examination were published in Brian Jenkins, Protecting Surface
Transportation Systems and Patrons from Terrorist Activities: Case Studies of
Best Security Practices and a Chronology of Attacks (San Jose: Norman Y.
Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies,
December 1997).
NEW FINDINGS
Phase II of the research has continued to the present time and is reported upon
in this study. It comprises four case studies: the 1995 sarin attack on Tokyo’s
subways, the United Kingdom’s response to the IRA’s terrorist campaign
against British surface transportation, and security at the Bay Area Rapid
Transit District and the Santa Clara Valley Transit Authority. The chronology
that began in Phase I has been brought forward to the end of the 2000 calendar
year; the annotated bibliography has been updated.
Taken together, this and the earlier two volumes give a comprehensive review
of surface transportation security. The case studies cover 14 transportation
systems in the United States plus those in Japan, France, and the United
Kingdom, yielding a truly global perspective on what has become a global
threat to travelers and citizens alike.
The last three case studies were included because they offer an opportunity to
examine security and crisis management at transportation systems that have
been the targets of major terrorist attacks. Each system experienced a
completely different threat. The United Kingdom had to cope with a long-
running terrorist campaign aimed at causing major disruption and occasionally
some casualties. France confronted a terrorist campaign aimed at causing
heavy casualties. Tokyo’s subways saw the first large-scale terrorist use of a
chemical weapona possibility of growing concern in other parts of the
world. There have been more attacks and a greater number of casualties in
places like India and Pakistan, but the experiences of the United Kingdom,
France, and Japan are more comparable to the conditions in the United States.
Introduction
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The studies of the IRA’s campaign in England and the sarin attack in Tokyo
included in this volume offer us something not available in the other case
studies: insight into the terrorists themselves—what they were trying to
achieve and how they decided to go about it. Such knowledge is a valuable
first step for developing successful countermeasures. That said, the British and
Japanese experiences presented completely different terrorist rationales and
operations.
The ongoing campaign in the United Kingdom enabled those charged with
security to carefully analyze the modus operandi of the adversary, determine
appropriate countermeasures, discern results, and make adjustments as the
campaign evolved. Authorities were able to diagnose, comprehend, and
respond to the threat.
The sarin attack was different. Although the Aum Shinrikyo sect made test runs
of nerve gas releases prior to the March 20 attack (not recognized by
authorities as precursors) and additional low-level attacks occurred afterward,
the March 20 attack was a single stunning event. There were no patterns to be
discerned, no ongoing campaign to be analyzed. Security was increased, but
the system remained virtually defenseless against chemical attacks. Japanese
authorities focused on destroying the group and its capacity to wage chemical
or biological warfare. The major lessons fell within the category of crisis
management, which must be a part of all security programs.
The two studies of security measures in effect at the two transportation systems
in Northern California, in turn, differ from the London and Tokyo examples.
Crime occurs everywhere and an incident of terrorism can occur anywhere—
witness the Tokyo sarin attack and the Oklahoma City bombing—but the
terrorist threat to California must be assessed as less than that in the United
Kingdom or other places where terrorist activity has regularly occurred over a
long period of time.
Given the relative quiet on the domestic front, the security measures taken by
the Bay Area Rapid Transit Agency (BART) and the Santa Clara County Valley
Transit Authority (VTA) are not nearly as elaborate as those taken in England
or Tokyo. This raises the question of threat assessment: If no apparent threat is
on the horizon, yet nothing can ever be ruled out, how much security is
enough? Is a full-scale terrorist threat the only way to marshal enough security,
or should public agencies take action to prevent such a threat? Given scarce
resources and relatively low levels of public concern, such questions are
always a part of the public policy matrix and not easily answered.
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The updated chronology adds 195 entries to the 631 entries listed in the first
volume. Inasmuch as some of these entries are multiple events, we now have a
database of terrorist attacks and serious violent crimes exceeding 800
incidents, which offers greater confidence in the statistical analysis. The
updated chronology shows that the patterns of terrorism in terms of targets and
tactics remain stable. The locations of the attacks shift somewhat, reflecting
slowly changing patterns of global conflict. Terrorist attacks on transportation
targets continue to be significantly more lethal than terrorist attacks overall,
underlining the fact that terrorists see train stations, bus depots, cars, and
coaches as killing fields.
A separate Executive Overview distills the lessons learned in both phases of
the research and describes the best security practices identified in all the case
studies and the accompanying security literature. This document will serve as a
primer to accompany further briefings and detailed discussions with
transportation system operators and security officials, which are envisioned for
Phase III.
Introduction
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THE UNITED KINGDOM’S RESPONSE TO THE IRA’S
TERRORISM CAMPAIGN AGAINST
MAINLAND SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
Any study of “best practices” in securing transportation against terrorist
attacks must include an examination of the British experience in dealing with
terrorist attacks carried out by the Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican
Army (IRA). Few other counties have faced such a sustained campaign of
violence. Unlike many other contemporary terrorist groups, the IRA did not
hijack or sabotage commercial airliners; armies “do not do such things.”
However, the organization waged a 25-year campaign against surface
transportation, attacking targets in Northern Ireland and Britain.
Transport was not the IRA’s only target on the British mainland. The group
also attacked public officials, government buildings, tourist sites, public
events, and commercial property. The organization’s reason for such activities
was simple: to remind British officials and the British public that the
“troubles” would not be confined to Northern Ireland alone; as long as turmoil
existed in Northern Ireland, it would exist in the heart of Great Britain as well.
In response to the IRA’s terrorist campaign, British authorities were forced to
implement extraordinary security measures. The analysis of the terrorist threat,
the government’s strategic approach to security, response procedures, and
involvement of the public are all worthy of examination.1
The following case study describes London’s Underground, a favorite target of
the IRA, as well as light railways, buses, and the national rail network. It then
examines the IRA’s strategy and the evolution of its terrorist campaign, and
describes the transportation security structure and the general approach and
specific countermeasures taken to save lives and reduce disruption.
THE UNDERGROUND
The London Underground is the world’s oldest and one of its largest
underground railway systems. Its first line opened in 1863. Additional lines
were added as London grew during the nineteenth century, and expansion
1 In addition to the cited publications, this chapter draws heavily on interviews in London with,
and material provided by, officials of the Department of Environment, Transport and Regions,
the British Transport Police, the Metropolitan Police, and the National Terrorist Crime
Prevention Unit.
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continued throughout the twentieth century. The last route, the Jubilee Line,
was completed in 1979. Today, the Underground, or “tube” as it is known,
comprises 12 separate lines that crisscross London and extend well into the
suburbs.
Only 42 percent of the Underground’s rails actually run underground;
operation takes place through two types of tunnels. One form, “cut and cover”
tunnels, are created by excavating from the surface, then covering the trench;
in some parts, the trenches are left uncovered and the trains run just below or at
ground level. These tunnels carry 8 percent of the system’s lines. The second
form, deep-level tubes, are excavated far below the surface and are completely
covered upon completion. Thirty-four percent of the rails are deep-level tubes.
To a considerable extent, the form of rail design determines the type of engines
that move rail traffic. While steam locomotives initially were used on the
subsurface lines, only electrical trains could operate in the deep tunnels, the
first of which was completed in 1890. Electrification accompanied expansion
of the system, although the last steam engines were not removed until 1962.
During World War II, the tunnels were used as air raid shelters and thousands
of people slept in them during the bombing campaign. One of the lines was
closed and its tunnel used to store treasures from the British Museum.
The Underground’s routes total approximately 259 miles (416.7 kilometers)
and serve 278 stations. Trains move 150,000 people every hour. During the
morning peak travel hours, 34,000 passengers pass through Victoria Station,
which has been attacked by the IRA several times. The District Line, the
system’s busiest, carries 545,000 passengers a day; the Northern Line carries
530,000 passengers; the Piccadilly Line, 520,000 passengers; the Metropolitan
and Circle Lines, 500,000 each. In 1999, the Underground carried passengers
on 930 million trips, a figure that was expected to surpass 1 billion in 2000.
Because the Underground is the circulatory system of the city, even short
disruptions can produce enormous problems. This has made it a preferred
target of the terrorist campaign.2
LIGHT RAIL
Two recently completed light rail systems expand London’s Underground
network, the Docklands Light Railway and the Croyden Tramlink. Opened in
2 Anthony Clayton, Subterranean City: Beneath the Streets of London, London: Historical
Publications, Ltd., 2000.
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1987, the Docklands connects the Underground with the Canary Wharf
business complex, the Millennium Dome, and other new developments in
London’s old Dockland area on the eastern edge of the city; eventually the line
will reach London’s City Airport. Currently the system has 27 kilometers
(17 miles) of track, mostly elevated, connecting 34 stations. It operates 30
trains, which carry 110,000 passengers a day.
In February 1996, the IRA detonated a bomb under the railway bridge at
Surrey Quay in the Docklands. Two people were killed, and more than 100
people were injured, seven seriously. In a statement to the news media, the IRA
indicated that the bombing signaled the end to its 17-month cease-fire and
demanded that the British government convene talks involving all parties,
including the IRA’s political wing, to negotiate a settlement to the conflict.
The Croyden Tramlink, which opened in May 2000, connects the suburb of
Croyden with London. Its 21 trams connect 38 stops along 28 kilometers
(18 miles) of winding track. The trams, which are designed to handle tight
curves, run both on city streets and on previous, abandoned rail lines.
Configured in six-car formats, each tram can carry as many as 200 passengers.
LONDON’S BUSES
The double-deck red bus is a symbol of London. More than 4,000 of them
move nearly 4 million people daily throughout the 1,500 square miles of
Greater London. At one time, there were twice that many, but new
Underground lines and private automobiles reduced bus ridership, while
budget constraints limited modernization and expansion. Forced to contend
with growing surface-street traffic, the buses lost their advantage as efficient
and inexpensive transportation sources. Recent policy changes, however, may
precipitate a reversal of this trend. Urban architects readily concede that
building more roads to and from a city already choked with traffic and
suffering from pollution is not the answer.
Buses take up less road space, move more people with less energy, and can be
made nearly pollution-free, in contrast to the old black-smoke-belching diesel
engines. Restrictions on automobile parking, dedicated bus lanes, and smart
traffic signals can reduce delays in schedules.
As noted in the chronology presented in Appendix A at the end of this chapter,
terrorist bombs on buses can yield exceptionally deadly results. Recent attacks
in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Israel bear witness to the toll of human
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devastation. However, bus explosions cause less disruption to a system than
attacks on railways. If the bus is halted and evacuated, or even if the bomb
detonates causing casualties, traffic can be rerouted and service restored more
easily. Sabotaging rails and placing bombs in stations provide greater
opportunities for escape and more time to give warnings that could prevent
catastrophe, but the disruptive effects are enormous. Putting bombs on buses
entails greater risk and offers fewer opportunities for warning would-be
victims.
Although the IRA terrorist campaign in England focused on rail transportation
rather than buses, the organization selected buses as the targets of several
attacks. On February 18, 1996, less than 10 days after the bombing of the
Docklands Light Railway, a terrorist bomb exploded on a London bus near
Covent Garden. One person died and eight others were injured in the
explosion. The following day, the IRA claimed responsibility, expressing
regret for any casualties. The fact that the bombing occurred without any
warning caused authorities to suspect that the bomb may have exploded
accidentally while being transported to another target. However, because it
came so soon after the IRA’s deadly attack on the Docklands Light Rail, some
people feared that the IRA was intensifying its terrorist attacks in England.
UNITED KINGDOM RAIL
Commuter trains, which provide transportation into and out of London, are
part of UK Rail, a network of 25 independent railroads that provide passenger
service throughout the United Kingdom. International transfers are available
via the EuroStar, a high-speed passenger service that connects London with
Paris and Brussels via the Channel Tunnel, or “Chunnel.”
As part of its disruptive activities, the IRA carried out a number of attacks on
train stations and the rail network, and vandals disrupted the UK Rail high-
speed service. Because of these efforts, extraordinary security precautions
were put into place to protect the Channel Tunnel against terrorist attack. In
1996, British security forces foiled the only documented attempt by the IRA to
shut down the Channel Tunnel by sabotaging the electricity supply.
THE IRA’S TERRORIST CAMPAIGN
Irish resistance to British rule of the island has continued for centuries under a
variety of banners. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) traces its history to the
1920 armed rebellion that ultimately paved the way to independence for the
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Irish Free State while British rule continued in Northern Ireland. Opposing this
partition, the IRA continued a sporadic campaign of terrorism.
In the late 1960s, shortly after widespread violence broke out between
Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, the IRA split into the official
and provisional wings. It was the Provisional IRA that waged an intense
terrorist campaign against the British from 1969 to 1998, at which time the
organization agreed to a cease-fire. However, a splinter group calling itself the
“Real IRA” has continued to carry out terrorist attacks.3
The IRA’s strategy was never especially profound. With active members
numbering between 50 and several hundred, depending on the year, the group
initially confined its campaign to Northern Ireland. Principal efforts focused
upon attacking police and military targets, while waging economic warfare
through bombings of commercial targets. The organization realized from the
start that it could not defeat the security forces arrayed against it in a true
military sense; it could try only to keep the faith alive, survive organizationally,
continue the fight, and hope to eventually wear down British resolve. Thus, the
opposition group operated essentially with a strategy of economic and
psychological attrition, or, as one IRA leader described it, “blattering on until
the Brits leave.”
In 1973, the IRA exported its terrorist campaign to England. Wales and
Scotland were left untouched because, like the Irish, they were considered
“culters,” not English; as such, these groups were perceived as ethnic allies.
The terrorists hoped that attacks in England would increase security problems
and costs for the British government. Indeed, some of the major terrorist
bombings in London caused hundreds of millions of pounds in damages and
wiped out insurance coverage, forcing the government to step in as the insurer
of last resort. The terrorist threat to London also obliged security authorities to
erect the so-called “ring of steel,” an elaborate array of traffic diversions,
checkpoints, and surveillance designed to keep truck bombs out of the city’s
financial center.
3 In addition to the interviews cited above, accounts of the IRA’s campaign are based upon:
J. Bowyer Bell, The IRA 1968-2000: Analysis of a Secret Army, London: Frank Cass
Publishers, 2000; C.J.M. Drake, Terrorists’ Target Selection, Basingstoke: MacMillan Press
Ltd., 1998; Tony Geraghty, The Irish War: The Military History of a Domestic Conflict,
London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1998; and the author’s own research.
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Terrorist bombs in London, even smaller ones, captured more headlines than
terrorist bombs in Northern Ireland, had great psychological impact, and
exaggerated the power of the IRA. Terrorism in England also kept the struggle
on the British political agenda. Still, the IRA’s expectations had to be realistic.
As one knowledgeable analyst of the IRA’s campaign put it, “If Hitler had not
bombed London into submission, the IRA certainly lacked the capacity to do
so.”4 The IRA did not seek true submission, however; instead it sought the
erosion of public patience and political will. It forced people to ask whether the
commitment of British troops in Northern Ireland was worth the blood, the
inconvenience, and the fear.
With goals so broadly defined, almost any terrorist action would serve the
needs of a terrorist organization. Political or strategic rationales did not dictate
IRA targets in England; operational considerations did. The IRA did what was
possible, using its available resources. Capabilities in England were limited.
Volunteers were its most precious commodity and had to be preserved. This
dictated low-risk operationstargets had to be “soft” with few defenses and
offering an easy escape.
Two levels of IRA operatives participated in the attacks. Active Service Units
composed of better trained volunteers, the “A team,” carried out the major
terrorist attacks; less sophisticated volunteers, the “B team,” waged a
continuing campaign of low-level terrorism. There were few technically
demanding operations—the attack on Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at a
Brighton Beach hotel, the mortar attack on Number 10 Downing Street, and
the two truck bombs in London’s financial district. The attacks on the
Underground and rail system appeared to be the work of the less sophisticated
operators—low-level, but potentially still deadly.
Of the 81 explosive devices that were placed at transport targets, 79 were hand-
placed time bombs. Fifty percent of them did not work as intended. Altogether,
three people were killed by IRA bombs on the rail system, one at Victoria
Station in 1991, and two on the Docklands Light Railway in 1996. This low
number of casualties, however, is not due solely to the terrorists’ great pains to
avoid casualties. Without the authorities’ prompt response to threats, the death
toll could have been much higher.
Killing by itself, however, was seldom the IRA’s goal. The IRA did not seek
mass casualties like the Islamic extremists who bombed the Paris Metro or the
4 J. Bowyer Bell, op.cit. p. 229.
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Aum Shinrikyo cult members who spread sarin in Tokyo’s subways. It had a
different set of values and objectives. Too many corpses could alienate
perceived constituents—Catholics in Northern Ireland as well as sympathizers
and supporters abroad.
A target was chosen simply because it was vulnerable, and once it was
selected, the IRA would continue to attack it for as long as circumstances
permitted. London’s vulnerable Underground met these criteria. While
perimeters around government buildings could be pushed out further and
hardened, and the financial district of London could be surrounded with a ring
of steel, millions of people still had to ride the Underground every day.
Surveillance and security could be increased, but, like the Belfast-to-Dublin
rail line, which the IRA also bombed repeatedly, terrorist attacks on the
Underground and mainland rail lines could not be entirely prevented.
Assaults on the Underground disrupted the lives of millions of passengers,
offering the IRA banner headlines and inspiring footage for television news.
Moreover, the IRA could magnify the disruption through bomb threats, which
required nothing more than phone calls. Because real bombings occurred often
enough, authorities could not afford to ignore such phone calls.
The result, as we see in the chronology at the end of this chapter, was a long-
running terrorist campaign aimed at the mainland’s surface transportation
system, with the majority of attacks occurring in four discernible stages:
• between February 1976 and March 1976, comprising four incidents
• between December 1991 and February 1993, comprising 18 incidents
• between February 1996 (the end of a 17-month cease-fire) and April 1996,
comprising three incidents
• a final surge in April 1997, comprising four incidents.
Putting aside bomb threats, it appears that except for one period in 1976, the
IRA was able to carry out only one or two attacks a month with long hiatuses
in between.
Seventeen persons were killed in attacks on all transport in England, 11 of
them in the single attack on soldiers and their families traveling on a bus in
England. The IRA regarded this as a military target. More than 200 persons
were injured, over half of them in a single incident—the 1996 bombing of the
Docklands Light Railway. Disruption rather than casualties appears to have
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been the objective, but the disruption caused by threats and consequent
evacuations and shutdowns rested on the IRA’s credibility, and credibility
required casualties.
The chronology does not give the total picture of the IRA terrorist campaign.
Bombings and shootings occurred frequently in Northern Ireland. The IRA
also attacked the Belfast-to-Dublin rail line on numerous occasions. In addition
to attacks on public transport in England, the IRA carried out mortar attacks
against the Prime Minister’s residence and Heathrow Airport, and a number of
other attacks including two devastating truck bombs set off in the heart of
London in 1992 and 1993. The terrorist threat remained high throughout the
period.
Along with the inevitable copycats and malicious pranksters who were
inspired by terrorist events, the IRA’s campaign imposed a staggering burden
on transportation security and a nervous public. Between 1991 and 1997, there
were 41 IRA attacks on transportation targets in England involving 81 devices,
29 explosions, and 3 deaths. In addition, there were 6,569 telephone bomb
threats; 9,430 suspicious objects were reported and investigated. The
Underground and railroads also had to deal with more than a quarter-million
lost or abandoned items every year, any one of which might have been a bomb.
THE SECURITY ORGANIZATION
The security network for combating terrorism comprised the intelligence
agencies of the British government, the Home Office, the Metropolitan Police
(Scotland Yard), other local police departments, and the National Terrorist
Crime Prevention Unit (NTCPU). Two organizations focused specifically on
the security of surface transportation. These are the Transport Security
Division of the Department of the Environment, Transport and Regions
(DETR), and the British Transport Police.
The DETR’s Transport Security Division is a policy-making body responsible
for the security of British surface transportation. The division conducts
analysis, recommends legislation, and provides security directions and
guidance to transportation operators. One of its special areas of concern is the
security of the Channel Tunnel, which has implemented elaborate security
precautions in response to the flurry of terrorist threats. In 1998, the DETR
initiated its own “best practices” review to improve security at rail stations
throughout the United Kingdom and, as part of the process, issued a number of
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guideline documents. One review of the DETR status is presented in
Appendix B at the end of this chapter.
The British Transport Police (BTP) is the national police force for the railways
that provides policing service to rail operators, their staff, and passengers in
England, Wales, and Scotland. The BTP also is responsible for policing the
London Underground system, the Docklands Light Railway, the Midland
Metro Tram System, and Croyden Tramlink. The force does not cover bus
transport, which is left to local police departments. In 2000, the British
Transport Police had 2,106 police officers and 524 civilian support staff
deployed in eight territorial areas. Areas 6 and 7 encompass North and South
London respectively, while Area 8 comprises London’s Underground.
The devastating results from an IRA bombing of a shopping center in
Manchester in 1996 led to an increased demand for security advice from the
private sector. Local police departments had no centralized operation for
assisting retail stores and other commercial enterprises, nor was there a
consistent national approach. In 1998, the Association of Chief Police Officers
established the National Terrorist Crime Prevention Unit (NTCPU), a small
office that began by formulating a National Terrorist Crime Prevention
Strategy. The NTCPU also collates and disseminates “best practices”
information for preventing terrorist crimes. It provides training and supporting
literature to its “core customers,” commercial and professional bodies like the
British Retail Consortium and Association of Town Centre Managers. The
NTCPU extended its activities at the local level through Counter Terrorist
Crime Prevention Officers (CTCPOs) provided by each police department;
these individuals, in turn, distribute NTCPU materials to the private sector.
By tradition, security has largely been a reactive enterprise. Although the
terrorist threat level remains high, the NTCPU knows that it has to convince
business consumers that implementation of recommended security measures
will deter or prevent terrorism and reduce ordinary crime. In the United States,
liability lawyers provide an additional incentive for implementing security
measures, because failure to do so can lead to a charge of negligence and
punitive damages; the United Kingdom is less litigious. The NTCPU’s
approach is to have packages of advice-containing material ready to go. When
threats or incidents heighten concern, the material is distributed to a sensitized
audience.
The United Kingdom’s Response to the IRA'STerrorism Campaign
Against Mainland Surface Transportation
Mineta Transportation Institute
16
INCREASED SECURITY
Two goals drove the security strategy of public authorities: the protection of
lives, and the reduction of disruption. Obviously, lives could not be imperiled
just to keep the trains running, but shutting down for long periods could disrupt
the entire network. Through careful analysis and research, the police learned
how to distinguish what terrorists typically do from public behavior. Every
incident was closely analyzed; as incidents accumulated, patterns could be
discerned. This effort was facilitated by the high volume of terrorist activity
and by the tendency of the IRA to adhere to certain patterns.
Security was increased in a variety of ways. Many of these are part of a
program called Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED),
which has attained widespread acceptance.
• Architectural Liaison Officers. Each police department designated an
Architectural Liaison Officer (ALO) to gather detailed knowledge of blast
effects on structure, cladding, glazing, principles of bomb shelter areas (see
below), policy and initiatives on new buildings and refurbishments, the
counterterrorist impact on fixtures, street furniture, etc. ALOs advise local
commercial entities on security issues in design and construction.
• Visibility. Where new stations were being constructed or old ones
remodeled, new designs ensured good visibility for passengers and camera
surveillance systems.
• Bomb shelter areas. Bomb shelter areas (BSAs) were identified as areas
within a building or other facility likely to suffer minimal damage from any
explosion. If time or specific circumstances (such as a car bomb on the
street outside) prevented evacuation, people would be routed to a bomb
shelter area prequalified by an experienced structural engineer.
Government guidelines recommended locating BSAs away from windows,
external doors and walls, the “perimeter structural bay,” the floor structure
between a building’s perimeter, and the first line of supporting columns.
The guidelines also recommended shelters surrounded by full-height
masonry or concrete walls, but not in stairwells or areas with access to
elevator shafts that open to the ground level. BSAs were designed to permit
access to the “outside” world.
• Litter bins. Blast-resistant litter bins approved by the Police Scientific and
Development Branch were deployed in accordance with NTCPU
guidelines. Operators were warned against removing trash containers,
because this could lead to piles of rubbish that might conceal explosive
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devices. Litter bins were to be located in prominent, well-lit areas, within
view of closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems and away from sources
of secondary fragmentation such as windows, mirrors, or overhead glass.
Operators were advised to consider all materials located above, below, and
to the sides of the litter bin. They were not to be located adjacent to obvious
terrorist targets like police stations, post offices, or banks. Bin liners were
to be transparent to provide a clear view of litter bin contents.
• Fencing. Fencing was improved around stations and, where possible, along
rail lines. Analysis showed that when IRA saboteurs placed bombs on rail
lines, they followed the existing paths used by trespassers. They also chose
locations that had good access from nearby roads to minimize their own
risk.
• Lighting. Lighting was improved inside the stations to deter crime of all
types, facilitate surveillance, and reassure passengers. Bombs often were
located in poorly lit areas.
• Closed-Circuit Television. British authorities have used CCTV
extensively as a deterrent. Initially, more than 3,500—and ultimately more
than 5,000—cameras monitored transport activity. CCTV was used to
monitor activity, detect suspicious action, recognize individuals, and
identify suspects beyond reasonable doubt. All station cameras were
directly accessible to the police and could be called up on demand. In
locating cameras, transport operators were advised to identify areas where
passengers were most vulnerable; situate cameras so that they could not
easily be avoided, damaged, or obscured; and use cameras for extending
coverage to the immediate surrounding area. Although CCTV proved
enormously effective in reducing crime and contributing to the deterrence
of terrorism, authorities found that CCTV by itself was not enough. A
combination of CCTV coverage plus police patrols and prompt police
response made the greatest contribution to security.
• Passenger communications systems. Passenger communications systems
included public address systems, help points, telephones, and emergency
alarms. Passengers were instructed as to what constituted an emergency
and were encouraged to use the help points and alarms when appropriate.
CCTV cameras covered the help points and alarms so that staff could see
who was calling and why. Staff communicated through mobile telephones
and two-way radios.
• Bomb threat paging. One unique use of technology in the United
Kingdom was bomb threat paging. Customers with pagers who subscribed
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to the service were alerted through pagers and provided with directions on
evacuation or areas to avoid.
• Extra staff. Extra rail staff members were deployed to assist in
surveillance, help passengers, and contribute to deterrence.
• Patrols. Overt and covert police patrols were increased. Both rail staff and
police constantly kept a lookout for suspicious objects. In some cases,
Underground and rail stations were searched hourly.
• Handling of unattended items. The quarter million items left unattended
or abandoned in stations and on trains each year imposed a tremendous
burden on security. Although no unattended bag was ever linked to an
explosive device, every unattended bag had to be checked. A standardized
reporting form was used to record where the item was found, its contents,
whether the bag was X-rayed, and whether the bomb squad had been
called. Every left item was photographed.
• Detailed guidance. Security required the active participation of the
transport police and local police departments, transport system operators,
rail staff, and the general public. To ensure that operators would get the
most out of the security measures taken by the operators and their staffs,
the police and NTCPU disseminated easy-to-understand guidelines and
advice on everything from deploying CCTV cameras and litter bin
placements to handling left parcels and responding to bomb threats. These
were distributed as booklets, flyers, laminated cards, videos, and through
Web sites.
• Private sector involvement. The authorities enlisted the private sector as a
security partner. As part of an effort to achieve consistency and improve
prevention and response, police shared confidential threat information,
provided an array of instructional material, and offered direct advice to
commercial centers, facility managers, and transport operators.
• Alert levels with predetermined security menus. The Security Service
distributed written assessments of any terrorist threat to all police forces
and to retail and commercial sectors on a confidential basis. Rail operators
and commercial centers in train stations also received threat assessments.
The system identified four levels of alert. At Level Four, the lowest,
commercial companies were advised to continue routine crime prevention
measures, terrorism awareness training, frequent testing and regular
auditing of security and CCTV systems, and periodic checks of building
perimeters. Level Three advised, in addition to Level Four measures,
“good housekeeping checks” on perimeters at opening and closing times,
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practicing search plans and emergency evacuations, updating emergency
contact lists, checking security systems, reporting all suspicious incidents,
and raising the profile of security personnel. Level Two advised increasing
the frequency of perimeter checks, identifying and securing high-risk
areas, escorting all visitors, carefully examining all items brought into the
premises, searching regularly for suspicious packages, controlling access
to staff and customer car parks, and postponing non-essential maintenance.
A Level One notice, the highest level of alert, contained specific guidance
from the police and security service to precise locations and companies.
• Training. Operating in ways similar to bomb squad hostage negotiators,
the CTCPOs and ALOs had specific counterterrorist missions. The nature
of terrorism—the fact that terrorists could attack anything, anywhere,
anytime—dictated special training for the police. Great emphasis was
placed on standardized procedures that would ensure consistency and
thereby facilitate coordination.
• Covert testing. To ensure that security was being maintained, authorities
regularly conducted covert tests, such as leaving a bag containing a
suspicious object on a train or in a station.
• Involvement of the public. Public involvement was critical to the security
strategy, despite the limitations and risks of false alarms, especially
immediately following terrorist attacks. Signage and repeated public
announcements kept the public alert to the terrorist threat and the need to
keep personal packages under direct control, remain vigilant for left
parcels, and immediately report suspicious activity or articles to staff.
Police remained confident that any left parcels would be discovered in
minutes, and because most IRA bombs were set with one hour or more on
the timer, police would have time to respond.
• Dissemination of “good” or “best practices.” Authorities made a
continuing effort to identify good security measures or “best practices” and
disseminate them through instructional material and advice offered by the
NTCPU and the designated Counter Terrorist Crime Prevention Officers in
each police force.
Few transport systems experience terrorist events, making it difficult to gauge
the effectiveness of security measures. In Britain, however, the persistence of
the IRA campaign allowed such measurement. The evolution of the terrorist
campaign indicates that the security measures had a discernible effect. In 1991,
IRA terrorist attacks centered on stations in London. By 1992, the attackers
were pushed out to suburban stations, and by 1993, they were confined to
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home counties. The targets of the attackers also shifted from stations to switch
boxes and rail lines away from stations. In the later years of the terrorist
campaign, there were fewer bombs and more bomb threats.
The security measures against terrorism also had the additional effect of
reducing ordinary crime (as did the “ring of steel” around London’s financial
district). Crime in the Underground, which had been increasing in the late
1980s, reversed direction and declined 54 percent in the 1990s, bucking a
national trend.
Despite the increased security and positive effects, the nature of the target
precluded any hope of completely preventing terrorist attacks. Some things
could not be done: For example, passenger screening or the examination of all
briefcases and parcels were not considered realistic measures for a public
transportation system used by millions of people daily.
Another measure of effectiveness was disruption. As the authorities became
more familiar with the IRA’s modus operandi, they were able to develop
procedures that reduced response time and the duration of disruptions.
Increased camera coverage enabled them to identify and deal with suspicious
objects or promptly diagnose the situation, while rehearsed procedures reduced
the amount of search time. Authorities measured total disruption time in
minutes much in the same way that train operators tracked total delays. As
responses improved, total disruption time was reduced. However, this type of
measure would be possible only in cases of a long-term continuing terrorist
campaign.
RESPONDING TO BOMB THREATS
Bomb threat responses posed the most common problem, owing to the great
number of hoax threats by pranksters as well as efforts by the IRA to capitalize
on their actual bombs in order to increase the overall disruption. Bomb threats
might be telephoned to the police, but the potential targets included
commercial properties, shopping malls, hotels, and transport operators.
Anyone in any of these facilities might receive the call—a secretary,
switchboard operator, headquarters office, information line—whatever
telephone number the terrorists or hoax perpetrators had available or chose to
call.
Given the multiplicity of potential targets, authorities attempted to train
everyone involved to obtain as much information as possible and promptly
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forward it to the police. Armed with accurate information, the police could
assist in the assessment and respond without delay. The government
disseminated manuals giving detailed instructions on how to respond to bomb
threats, letter bombs, incendiary devices, bombs or suspicious objects found in
the facility, and bombs found in adjacent properties. Each new bombing attack
was examined for lessons learned, which were then shared with the private
sector. The authorities emphasized planning and established procedures for
notification, searches, and, when necessary, evacuation. Although there was
some risk that the distribution of some of this material outside the police force
might enable terrorists and hoax perpetrators to improve their efforts, ensuring
public safety took precedence. Interestingly, the IRA never mounted any
elaborate hoaxes. They planted bombs and made telephone calls.
Police carefully analyzed each and every terrorist incident and threat to look
for patterns that would enable them to more easily distinguish hoaxes from
genuine terrorist threats, the merely disruptive from the potentially deadly. Did
terrorists communicate differently from hoaxers? Where and how did terrorists
plant their bombs as opposed to the hoax devices sometimes found? The
objective was to establish guidelines that would take the pressure off the
individual decision maker and establish a routine that would protect lives,
reduce shutdowns, and be legally defensible if people were hurt.
The patterns were put into the context of the existing threat level, which varied
according to whether there was an ongoing surge in terrorist activity, upcoming
political events that had prompted terrorist activity in the past, or intelligence
indicating possible terrorist attacks. All threats were treated seriously initially
and then, depending on the available information, downgraded to probable
hoaxes but not dismissed until after the deadline expired. Authorities treated
threats thought to come from terrorists more seriously. In such cases, an
evacuation might be considered, but evacuations generally were not ordered
unless the search turned up a suspect object. Without a located device, it was
considered dangerous to evacuate, because people might be moved toward a
bomb. Even then, authorities had to worry about a secondary device, which the
IRA sometimes employed.
Of the more than 6,500 bomb threats directed against the Underground and
railroads between 1991 and 1997, about 100, fewer than 2 percent, were
considered serious. Of the 100 serious cases, evacuations or partial evacuations
were ordered in 41 cases, or less than two-thirds of 1 percent of the total
volume of reported threats.
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There is a popular misconception that the IRA deliberately assisted authorities
in distinguishing real threats from hoaxes by attaching a secret code word to
their communications. The IRA’s 1973 attack on the Baker Street Underground
Station was the first of the so-called coded calls. The IRA’s use of a code
ostensibly was intended to advise authorities when and where they had placed
a bomb so that the threat would not be considered merely another hoax. This
would enable the authorities to evacuate the target, thereby avoiding civilian
casualtiesthe IRA considered members of the bomb squad to be fair game.
Thus, the IRA would not bear the moral consequences of wanton killing, while
achieving its goals of disruption and property damage if the bomb went off.
All this, however, was only theory. According to authorities, there was never
any agreed-upon code, and hoaxers who read about the IRA codes could invent
and append their own codes. During the years of the IRA’s terrorist campaign,
London’s Metropolitan Police Department sometimes received up to 200 calls
a day, at least 50 of which contained some kind of code word. IRA members
themselves invented code words, leaving the authorities to ponder their
authenticity.5
Even when IRA callers provided a code word they had used before, thus
signaling the authenticity of the threat, they were often vague about the
location of the device or its timing. Part of this may be credited to the
inevitable “fog of war,” the confusion that accompanies all military or terrorist
operations; poor communications; not calling the right party; and erroneous or
ambiguous descriptions of locales that the attackers themselves did not know
well. However, some of it also may have been deliberate. Many hoaxes with
assorted code words that caused great disruption augmented the IRA’s own
terrorist campaign. If the public believed that IRA always used a code, then
they might blame explosions on the incompetence of the authorities in
responding, or worse, think that the government cynically wanted casualties to
fan public outrage against the IRA. A perfect arrangement was not in the IRA’s
interest.
CONCLUSION
Early in its terrorist campaign, IRA terrorists identified public surface
transportation in England as a preferred target for terrorist activity. From the
inception of their campaign in 1973 to the cease-fire in 1997, IRA terrorists
5 Peter Gurney, Braver Men Walk Away: Memoirs of the World’s Top Bomb-Disposal Expert,
London: Harper Collins, 1993, p. 50.
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continued to attack public transport, principally the London Underground and
commuter rail network. The authorities responded to the IRA’s campaign by
developing a national strategy aimed both at prevention and response and at
involving the police, the private sector, and the general public. A feature of this
response was the careful analysis of terrorist tactics, an analysis made possible
by the volume of the attacks and the terrorists’ adherence to set patterns.
Strong security measures did not prevent the terrorists from continuing their
campaign against public transport. Indeed, no security measures can prevent
terrorists from setting off bombs in public places. However, security did have a
discernible effect in obliging the terrorists to retreat to more remote targets,
while prompt, well-planned responses avoided needless casualties. A visibly
effective response also made it more difficult for the terrorists to carry out
incidents calculated to kill, while blaming the result on incompetent
authorities. The IRA could have killed wantonly had it chosen to do so, but it
could not easily slip the moral burden of its decision. Although second-rate
terrorists, reinforced by hoaxers, were able to achieve what the authorities
admitted were staggering results, the casualties remained very low and
disruptions were kept to a tolerable minimum.
Rail transport security benefited from the existence of a national-level office in
the Department of the Environment, Transport and Regions devoted to security
and a dedicated and experienced Transport Police. This ensured consistent and
high-quality systemwide security. Security measures, by themselves, cannot
end the terrorist campaign—that will require a political settlement.
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APPENDIX A: CHRONOLOGY OF IRA TERRORIST ATTACKS ON
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION IN ENGLAND
August 23, 1973 Bomb defused at Baker Street Underground Station in
London.
September 8, 1973 Bombing at Victoria Station injures 4 people.
Febr uary 3, 1974 Bomb on bus in Yorkshire carrying soldiers and their
families back to camp kills 11, injures 14.
Apr il 6, 1974 Bomb damages railway station in Birmingham.
October 9, 1975 Bomb at bus stop in London kills 1 person.
Febr uary 12, 1976 Bomb defused at Oxford Circus Underground station.
March 4, 1976 Bomb explodes on commuter train in London.
March 15, 1976 Bomb explodes on Underground in London, injuring 8
after the bomber shoots and kills the engineer.
March 18, 1976 Bomb explodes on Underground, injuring 1 person.
Febr uary 18, 1991 IRA renews terrorist campaign with bombings of
Victoria and Paddington Stations in London, leaving
1 dead, 43 injured.
Febr uary 25, 1991 Bomb destroys track in Hertfordshire.
August 29, 1991 Three bombs found under seat in Underground coach.
December 16, 1991 Bomb explodes near Clapham Station in South London.
December 23, 1991 Incendiary devices found on Underground cars in
London.
January 30, 1992 Incendiary device found under seat in Underground
coach.
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Febr uary 7, 1992 Incendiary device ignites on Underground track in east
London.
Febr uary 28, 1992 Bomb explodes in London Underground station,
injuring 25.
March 2, 1992 Bomb defused on tracks in Northern London.
March 10, 1992 Bomb explodes on tracks in South London.
May 8, 1992 Bomb alert empties London’s Victoria Station.
June 11, 1992 Bomb scares disrupt Underground.
August 28, 1992 Bomb threats temporarily stop London commuter
service.
October 9, 1992 Two bombs explode under cars parked near railway
stations in London.
October 13, 1992 Four bombings in central London.
October 21, 1992 Bomb detonates under Harrow Road Bridge in London.
October 22, 1992 Three bombs go off in London; two destroy rail tracks.
December 9, 1992 Bomb explodes in London Underground station.
December 23, 1992 Bomb explodes in London Underground station.
Febr uary 3, 1993 Bomb explodes on London-Kent train.
Febr uary 4, 1993 Bomb explodes on commuter train in London; another
explodes at Underground Station.
October 2, 1993 Three bombs explode in northern London, one near a
railway station.
December 14, 1993 Explosion on rail line southwest of London.
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December 21, 1993 Three bombs are found in London, one near Victoria
train station; coded warnings shut down 40 train stations
in southeast England.
March 15, 1994 Bomb found on rail line in Kent.
June 6, 1994 Bomb discovered at railway station in Kent.
Febr uary 9, 1996 Bomb on Dockland Railway kills 2, injures 100.
Febr uary 18, 1996 Bomb on London bus kills 1, injures 8.
Apr il 25, 1996 Two bombs found under Hammersmith Bridge in
London.
September 30, 1996 IRA attempts to block Channel Tunnel.
Apr il 7, 1997 Coded bomb threats disrupt London transportation.
Apr il 18, 1997 Bombs explode at stations in Leeds and Doncaster.
Apr il 21, 1997 Bomb threats at London Underground and train stations.
Apr il 29, 1997 More bomb threats on roads around London.
July 19, 2000 Bomb explodes on tracks in Underground station; coded
bomb threats disrupt system.
October 17, 2000 Bomb threats on rail lines north of London.
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APPENDIX B: BRITISH SECURE STATIONS SCHEME:
MANAGE AND DESIGN TO CUT DOWN CRIME
SUMMARY
In the United Kingdom, public transportation systems present unique
challenges for passengers and public authorities. Government research shows
that passengers on public transport are most concerned about their wellbeing
when waiting at stations. To combat this apprehension, the Government,
British Transport Police, and Crime Concern have launched the Secure
Stations Scheme, which encourages Britain’s rail companies to improve
security at stations and reassure customers of the government’s commitment to
passenger safety.
The national scheme includes all aboveground and underground rail stations
across England, Scotland, and Wales, which are policed by the British
Transport Police (BTP). The program has established national standards of
good practice in security, and expects the individual stations, which have
worked with the BTP and other local law enforcement partners, to implement a
package of security measures. Such measures include the following:
Design
• Good lighting and secure fencing in the station, car parks and approaches
• Up-to-date information and clear signs
• Clear lines of vision
Management
• Security staff presence/closed-circuit television surveillance
• Rapid response in emergencies
• Regular inspection and maintenance
• Special training for staff to deal with conflict and emergencies
Rail authorities are required by the plan to conduct an independent passenger
survey to ascertain whether passengers actually feel safe at the stations.
Authorities also are required to provide quantifiable evidence of decreasing
crime rates over a sustained period of time.
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BEST PRACTICES ACROSS BRITAIN
Many train operating companies have already taken the initiative to improve
security and passenger safety at stations. The specific entities and their efforts
include:
• Chiltern Railways
• Closed-circuit television (CCTV) monitoring at stations and car parks
• Improved lighting
• Security staff at commuter stations between 7 A.M. and 10 P.M.
Monday to Friday
• Secure fencing
• Connex South Eastern
• CCTV monitoring at stations
• Clear lines of vision and security mirrors in subways, on platforms, and
at station approaches
• Well-positioned lighting and secure railing
• Dedicated assistance areas such as public telephones on station
platforms (trial scheme)
• Staff training to deal with conflict and emergencies
• Security officer patrols
• Work in close cooperation with police and local communities
• LTS “Operation Safeguard” (Fenchurch Street line)
• Security guards at stations and mobile patrols
• Security patrols at station car parks
• Crime prevention officers and station staff cooperate closely with the
police and local communities
• Improved lighting and fencing
• CCTV monitoring at stations
• Help points are being introduced on all station platforms
• London Underground
• Clear and up-to-date travel and local area information
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• Emergency and information help points at stations
• Improved lighting
• Mirrors to give clear line of vision
• Staffed stations throughout opening hours
• Manchester Metrolink
• CCTV on every platform linked to the control room, which is
monitored during opening hours
• A police patrol unit dedicated to the station and immediately
surrounding area
• Good lighting and secure fencing
• Passenger emergency call point on all platforms, which goes directly to
a member of staff
• Mersey Rail
• CCTV monitoring on stations linked to 24-hour control center
• Rapid response and covert security guards
• Station lighting improvements
• ScotRail (Strathclyde and East Scotland)
• CCTV monitoring at 13 stations and car parks linked to staffed control
centers; these will be extended to 31 more sites.
• Information and emergency help points on platforms (monitored by
CCTV) and linked to staffed control center for immediate response
• Control centers have direct link to the British Transport Police
• South West Trains
• Help points (currently linked to 24-hour control center) to be installed
at 176 stations
• CCTV monitoring at stations
• Cutting back vegetation
• Improved lighting
• Security patrols at Richmond, Clapham, and Wimbledon
• Tyne & Wear Metro
• Alarm and enquiry points to be installed at all stations
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• CCTV monitoring at all stations linked to 24-hour control center
• Employ extra staff to provide assistance to passengers
• Play classical music at their stations (ongoing at 5 stations)
• Upgraded lighting at all stations
• Youth workers to work with children who loiter at stations
GOVERNMENT RESEARCH FINDINGS
Perceptions of Safety from Crime on Public Transport
• Public transport users feel least safe when they are waiting for train
services.
• Twenty-two percent of respondents stated that they would make more
journeys by public transport if security measures were introduced. Forty
percent of the extra journeys would be for social purposes and in the
evening.
• Measures to improve personal safety would result overall in an 11 percent
increase in the number of trips by public transport.
• Help points in train stations were widely regarded as an effective and
important measure for personal security when there is a immediate
response if activated.
• Respondents rated the following as the most effective safety measures at
train and underground stations:
• Good lighting
• Presence of staff
• CCTV to provide surveillance.
Recommendations
• CCTV should be highly visible to reassure passengers as well as to deter
potential criminals. Publicity should highlight that the CCTV is monitored
and is linked to someone who can provide help.
• Staff should wear uniforms that stand out, and they should be out in the
stations to reassure the public by their presence.
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• Good quality information in stations was felt to be essential to help plan
safe journeys (for example, up-to-date information on service departures
and interconnecting services).
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THE VALLEY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY
OVERVIEW
The Valley Transportation Authority (VTA) offers two forms of public
transportation for users in Santa Clara County—the heart of Silicon Valley.
Since 1972, the agency has provided bus service, with a fleet that now numbers
525. Approximately 154,000 riders use the bus system each weekday, with
service connecting 79 routes at six transit centers located in Eastridge
Shopping Center, Gilroy, Mountain View, Palo Alto, San Jose Transit Mall
(downtown), and West Valley College. A tax measure passed in November
2000 allows for a substantial increase in the fleet.
In 1987, the VTA also began service on light rail, a small system that was
originally 21 miles in length and which, in December 1999, was increased to
28 miles. According to VTA officials, the system is one of the longest built in
the past 50 years. Currently, the system operates 50 rail cars that pass through
45 stations, all at ground level or above. The light rail system carries about
24,000 passengers per day. Service operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week,
at various intervals.
VTA light rail service is growing. As a result of a measure passed by the voters
in 1996, a new 8.3-mile east-west extension (the Tasman East-Capitol line) is
under construction, providing linkage between north First Street (site of much
high-tech business) and Capitol Avenue in east San Jose. With the passage of
Measure A in 2000, funds have been set aside for construction of the Vasona
line, a north-south route between downtown and Campbell. Work on this
6.8-mile route, which began in 2001, will be completed in approximately 2004.
The VTA is rapidly becoming a major source of surface transportation in Santa
Clara County.
CONCERNS AND STRATEGIES
The VTA has never experienced an incident remotely similar to terrorism on
surface transportation. Nevertheless, the agency has a crisis management
protocol for responding to questionable activities. Whether bus or light rail,
drivers are the “first line of defense” in detecting and responding to suspicious
circumstances. Thus, their job goes well beyond the roles of strictly
transportation providers.
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In addition to vigilant drivers, the VTA considers other personnel part of the
agency’s counterintelligence group. These individuals include mechanics,
administrators, and custodians, along with the traveling public. As the Chief of
VTA security states, “they’re [anyone remotely connected with VTA
functions] all part of the team. We need all of them to be aware.” The major
areas of concern are means for dealing with the following:
• Chemical weapons. Employees are instructed to determine the content of
any suspicious substance to the best of their ability, without endangering
themselves in the process. Employees are instructed to contact the Fire
Department, which is much more prepared to respond to chemical-related
issues, as soon as the situation has been assessed.
Although chemical attacks would be very effective against a single bus or a
single light rail car, most chemicals would dissipate once the doors opened.
Agency personnel are not overly concerned about the threat of chemical
weapons, because VTA operates above ground throughout the system. In
addition, the open-air configuration of light rail stations and the fact that
buses have limited exposure beyond the individual units of operation
further mitigate the likelihood of damage, should a chemical assault take
place. However, military-grade chemical weapons like VX or mustard gas,
which are persistent, would pose a significant threat to both initial victims
and rescuers and would make cleanup complex.
• Bombs. The presence of a bomb aboard a VTA transportation unit
generates a different response, depending upon whether the unit is a bus or
a light rail train. In the case of a bomb (or suspicious package believed to
be a bomb) on a bus, drivers are instructed to notify local authorities, then
remove the bus from a populated area. If drivers or other onboard
authorities believe that the bomb is unstable (because of a timing device or
its physical location), drivers are directed to clear the bus of all passengers
immediately without regard to location.
Light rail drivers have less flexibility because of the fixed track upon
which the system operates. Should operating personnel determine or
suspect that a questionable device is on board, they are instructed to stop
the train and remove all passengers as soon as possible; VTA personnel
will proceed to cordon off the area.
• Mentally disturbed passengers and physical property damage. VTA
officials are much more concerned with the presence of unstable
individuals on agency vehicles than with chemical or bomb attacks.
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Whether the problem is emotional instability, inebriation, or substance
abuse, the Chief of Security defines these as the real instances of “surface
transportation terrorism” in Santa Clara County. “Tagging,” or the use of
spray paint in public areas, is another agency concern. Here the problem
rests in offenses to the eye, rather than any potential loss of human life.
The potential disruption by individuals with emotional problems and those
who would cause property damage creates problems for VTA officials in
terms of obtaining assistance from higher levels of government. Because
these activities do not fit within established definitions of surface terrorism,
agency officials find it almost impossible to capture the attention of public
policy makers and bureaucrats, let alone any funds that are organized in
specific categories.
SECURITY ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL
The VTA operates with a very small security staff. With virtually no history of
terrorism or terrorist threats, agency officials believe that it is unnecessary to
dedicate more than minimum funds to this area. The security staff includes
25 armed deputies, 125 contracted security officers who are unarmed, and
9 unarmed fare inspectors who move randomly from train to train on the light
rail system.
Buses carry fare boxes, unlike the light rail service, for which passengers
purchase tickets on the honor system. Therefore, agency fare inspectors do not
board buses. However, a three-person troubleshooting unit travels by car along
problem-prone routes, with officers occasionally boarding a bus on a random
basis to check for any problems (see the Rapid Deployment Team discussion,
below).
In addition to the presence of these permanent personnel, agency officials
occasionally call upon a small number of Santa Clara County Sheriff’s
Department Reserve deputies. However, the number of Sheriff’s Reserve
deputies changes daily, and they are not considered part of the VTA security
network. The permanent personnel generally are considered sufficient for the
perceived level of threat.
SECURITY AND DETECTION TECHNOLOGY
The VTA has no modern technology designed to deal with surface
transportation terrorism threats. Agency personnel are not overly concerned
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about this because of the long peaceful history of the system. Should any
serious issue or terrorist threat arise, the agency’s security personnel would call
upon local police or the Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Department. “We’re not
in the policing business,” the Security Chief notes, expressing a point of view
considerably different from that of his security-minded colleagues in Tokyo
and London. “Our job is to move passengers from part of the service area to
another, period.”
The VTA has come to rely upon the City of San Jose to plan a response to
potential terrorism. With 900,000 residents, this city’s police department has
jurisdiction for most of the VTA light rail and bus system lines. Because the
city’s Fire Department covers the area where most of the transit lines operate,
there are no plans for VTA personnel to go through hazardous materials
training.
The VTA does utilize some anticrime resources in a preventive capacity,
although it remains unclear as to the value of their assistance in a true terrorism
crisis or other volatile situation. The major activity lies with what is described
as a Rapid Deployment Team, a three-person unit that drives throughout the
district along selected bus lines. Two of the members randomly board buses in
these targeted areas, while the third follows behind the bus in an unmarked car.
The agency hopes to add at least one more team in the near future. Other than
random fare inspectors, there are no security personnel on light rail vehicles.
The VTA clearly expects user tranquility as part of the daily operating
regimen, but such optimism may have limits. Given the possibility of
disruption, the agency is becoming more active in its security management.
One change with respect to detection may soon come in selected elements of
the light rail system. The Security Chief hopes to install closed-circuit
television at all of the light rail stations and vehicles in the near future. In
August of 2000, the cost for this network was estimated to be between
$2 million and $3 million. The head of VTA security believes that with the
installation of such security cameras, “50 percent of the agency’s problems
will go away.”
There are no closed circuit camera plans for the network of agency buses.
These vehicles are considered less vulnerable from the standpoint of
systemwide shutdown because of their relative mobility and detachment from
other elements of the transportation network.
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COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURES
All VTA vehicles have two-way radios for communication with the Control
Center near VTA headquarters. When a threat to the system occurs or is
detected, personnel are to call the Control Center for instructions. Serious
issues usually are transferred to local police or fire agencies in the region. The
agency makes no pretense of being self-contained in its ability to manage
serious problems.
A new Control Center is currently under construction. It will be located
adjacent to the Sheriff’s Department headquarters, permitting even closer
cooperation between the two jurisdictions, although not suggesting any change
in the dependency upon other law enforcement personnel.
PERSONNEL TRAINING
VTA bus drivers and light rail train operators go through six to eight weeks of
training. Virtually all the instruction deals either with bus and train mechanics
or passenger treatment. There is no employee training per se on terrorism or
potential assaults on either the bus or light rail systems. The lack of attention to
these matters reflects the opinion of the Chief of Security that the occurrence
of such events is highly unlikely. Instead, the Chief of Security says, drivers
and operators need to use “common sense.”
Despite the paucity of terrorism training, the agency depends upon drivers and
operators to use a simple “psychological profile” to determine the presence of
suspicious individuals or behavior. For example, if a driver spots a “suspicious
package” or something out of the mainstream, he or she is to call headquarters
if, upon exercising his or her own judgment, there is reason to do so. Indeed,
“judgment” stands out as the key word for action. With little attention other
than common sense directed to the terrorism question, it would appear that the
agency is allowing each driver to decide when and how to respond.
The biggest concern in the minds of security personnel is the possibility of a
person boarding a bus or train with a gun or other weapon. Such a person
might be a gang member, someone who needs to show off, or a mentally
disturbed individual. Because the appearance of these individuals often blends
in with other passengers, they are difficult to spot and, therefore, to manage.
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TERRORISM? WHAT TERRORISM? BART AND VTA COMPARED
The Bay Area Rapid Transit Authority (BART) and VTA cases simultaneously
reveal similarity and distinct contrast. They are similar in that neither system
has ever experienced any act remotely related to terrorist activity.
The two transportation agencies are quite different with respect to their
expressed concerns about potential terrorist activity. BART security
representatives worry about such a possibility and attempt to prevent it through
training and coordination; this effort is ongoing internally as well as through
interagency cooperation. Although VTA is part of interagency terrorism
response planning, its personnel are less concerned with the thought of a
terrorist threat than such issues as fare avoidance and graffiti.
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THE BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT
OVERVIEW
The Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART) is the largest automated rail
system in California. Currently serving a potential population of more than
three million people in Alameda County, Contra Costa County, San Francisco
County, and northern San Mateo County, BART tracks cover 95 miles
(153 kilometers).
In existence since 1972, BART has carried over 1.5 billion passengers more
than 18 billion passenger miles. Today, the system averages approximately
325,000 passengers per day. The rail system has slowly expanded over its
30-year history, with service connecting to San Francisco International Airport
expected to begin in late 2001. The fiscal year 2002 budget for BART will be
$367,931,100.
Currently, Santa Clara County hopes to expand BART service to several
locations in the county. With nearly two million people in a fast-growing part
of the greater San Francisco Bay Area, the county hopes to connect residents
and commuters with employment sites. This need has been exacerbated by the
fact that as of 2001, San Francisco-Oakland and San Jose had the dubious
distinctions of having the second- and fifteenth-worst automobile traffic
congestion in the nation. In November 2000, more than 70 percent of the
voters in Santa Clara County passed a ballot initiative that called for the
addition of one-half cent to the local sales tax for 30 years, estimating the
collection of $6 billion over the period. Of that amount, approximately
$2 billion will be set aside to fund BART, an amount that represents about half
the total cost of the 21-mile extension. Negotiations are underway to resolve
the many institutional, financial, technical, and other issues remaining before
the expansion can occur.
BART is a valuable link for moving people throughout the area, making the
system’s policies against surface terrorism worthy of examination.
MAINTAINING VIGILANCE AGAINST SURFACE TERRORISM
BART has never had a terrorism-related incident; the dissemination of mace by
a disgruntled passenger is the most serious incident ever to plague this regional
transportation agency. Nevertheless, its public safety personnel are acutely
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aware of incidents such as the 1995 event in Tokyo and IRA threats in the
United Kingdom and maintain vigilance at all times. Uniformed and station
personnel are on constant alert. In addition, the agency cooperates with the Bay
Area Terrorism Working Group, a planning organization whose members
include the FBI, the state’s Office of Emergency Services, and some transit
agencies, as well as police, fire, and other emergency personnel in various
jurisdictions between San Jose and Marin County. They also participate in
simulated transportation-related disaster exercises conducted annually by the
Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC). Since 1995, the agency has
attempted to enhance its agility by dividing its territory into four decentralized
zones.
BART uses the federal definition of terrorist threats:
• Chemical, perceived as the most serious threat because of the relative ease
with which harmful materials can be transported into or along a
transportation corridor and the fact that its use gives the terrorist instant,
yet potentially long-lasting, gratification from his or her activities;
• Biological, serious because of the nature of the potential disaster and the
fact that the full effects of activity may not be determined for three to five
days after it takes place;
• Radiological (nuclear), which is significant—although rarely discussed—
because of the ease with which someone can expose thousands of people to
low-tech, easy-to-get devices.
As part of its general preparedness, BART management personnel have
strategies for radiological, chemical, and biological incidents that could take
place along the system’s train lines and in stations. Each plan carries detailed
instructions and procedures pertaining to a particular type of incident and place
where it occurs. General elements include:
• Isolating the incident area to contain the effects of the material in the
smallest space possible
• An evacuation process that works to move people away from the source of
the attack in an orderly, yet quick, fashion
• Cessation of train service to prevent material from spreading into
previously uninfected areas
• Turning off the ventilation system to the extent that it helps to contain
materials that would otherwise travel by air
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• Dealing with the media to keep people apprised of events
• Coordination with other governments in ways that are seamless, rather than
duplicative or contradictory.
According to agency protocol, any remotely related terrorism incident, or
terrorist threat, will trigger a notification to the FBI. Because of the FBI’s
superior resources, availability of experts for rapid threat assessments and
evaluation of technical feasibility, and ability to marshal other federal
resources in response to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), their early
notification is considered critical to a coordinated and effective response.
CRISIS MANAGEMENT STRATEGY—PERSONNEL AND
PROCEDURES
As part of its ongoing preparedness program, BART maintains an elite group
of personnel who will serve as the first response team to a surface terrorism-
related incident. This carefully trained group of specialists (approximately five
to eight people on any given day) is available to assist with the management of
any WMD incident related to system disruption, including terrorist-related
activities. With agile responsiveness a high priority, the group can assemble at
any crisis site along the 95-mile system within 45 to 60 minutes of an
incident’s occurrence.
To ensure the most rapid response possible, core group members carry special
suits, hoods, gloves, and other protective equipment in their cars. Protective
equipment also is stored at strategic locations throughout the BART system.
These locations are known only to the specialists who have access to these
materials.
BART relies upon its trained personnel as a first line of defense against
terrorism or any other disruptive behavior. All employees are on alert at and
near each of the system’s 39 stations. Of particular concern are the 14 subway
stations along the lines of the system because of the inherent difficulties in
ventilating toxic fumes and removing people. The 12 surface and 13 aerial
stations present less risk to the system because they are located in open
environments, although they are more vulnerable to penetration by assailants.
In the event of an incident, the train operator, circulating patrol officer, or
station attendant is expected to notify the operations control center (known as
Central) in Oakland. Upon receiving such information, Central will isolate the
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area and organize immediate evacuation. Central and the BART Police
Department assume responsibility for contacting all other agencies with
specially trained first responders such as cooperating police departments, fire
departments, hazardous materials agencies, and the FBI. The potential for
downwind plume impacts and a concern for the surrounding community can
affect the extent of the contacts.
COORDINATED RESPONSE
BART recognizes that a terrorist act, or use of any WMD, will require a
coordinated response by all first responders to minimize casualties among both
the responders and impacted citizens. BART’s Nuclear/Biological/Chemical
Response plan and its general emergency plan are distributed to other first-
responding agencies to enable them to understand BART’s anticipated
response activities. In addition, BART has been the simulated venue for
regional table-top exercises involving the handling of terrorist incidents by
first responders from throughout the San Francisco Bay Area.
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
BART personnel acknowledge that there are no foolproof preventive measures
against a terrorist determined to disrupt the system or harm passengers. Except
for the tubes and underground corridor, the system is too open. Nevertheless,
the agency’s mission is to discourage antisocial behavior through carefully
trained personnel and equipment. Thus, BART officials rely primarily upon a
battery of cameras, police patrols, and psychological profiles as a collective
first line of defense against would-be terrorist activity.
Security Training
The BART system operates with 175 sworn (armed) officers, all of whom have
received police academy training. The system also employs approximately 300
unarmed station attendants. Although located only in the front cab of the train,
operators are also trained to watch for suspicious people both on board trains
and along the 95-mile track system.
Each officer employed by BART goes through four hours of training related to
chemical/biological/nuclear/explosive terrorism threats. A core set of
specialists takes another four hours of training. Every new employee must
attend a four-hour training video as a condition of employment, and several
attend conferences on terrorism and terrorism-related issues each year.
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Psychological Profiles
The BART crisis team has periodic table-top meetings, at which members
discuss potential crises, exercises, and possible responses. Once a year, the
BART system conducts a simulated multicasualty terrorist or disaster activity
with dozens of participants at a designated site. This drill is usually carried out
early on a Sunday morning so as not to disrupt normal traffic.
As part of its interaction with residents and passengers, the agency maintains
an awareness of any festering community issues as well as any threats that
could occur because of unusually challenging events or activities. These
include the Millennium, sports events, concerts, ethnic-related events, or other
activities that bring unusually large numbers of individuals into the system
over a brief time span.
Police Patrols
Police patrols circulate through the stations on a regular basis. The presence of
these personnel is a valuable deterrent to would-be assailants. As part of their
deterrence activities, agency personnel routinely intercept questionable people,
those who appear out of place or out of sorts. Such individuals usually depart
the area after such meetings.
Station attendants perform a second-tier level of ongoing surveillance. While
they have neither the training nor coercive power of BART police, attendants
serve as “eyes and ears” for any unusual activities. Often their mere
appearance is enough to discourage antisocial activities, because they are eye
witnesses to any unusual activities.
Stations
Stations contain emergency alarms inside each agent’s booth. In addition,
white courtesy telephones are located near the elevators that take passengers to
and from the platforms. At selected stations, fixed cameras remain focused on
the telephones and elevator waiting areas at all times. Outside the stations,
cameras and infrared spotlights placed in BART parking lots ensure
continuous surveillance of these areas for any type of criminal activity.
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Cameras
Remote-controlled cameras are directed from the Control Center in Oakland.
These instruments monitor traffic at selected stations along the system,
including the fare gates and platform areas. There are no cameras out on open
track, because people do not congregate there, nor are there cameras along the
transbay tube or any other underground areas in Oakland, San Francisco, and
Berkeley. BART security personnel believe that underground track areas (not
underground stations) are the most vulnerable spots in the system because of
the lack of cameras and other detection equipment in relatively closed
environments. BART has made some progress in obtaining funding to install
equipment at the transbay tube entrances and other critical underground access
points. Pedestrian alarms and closed-circuit television cameras should be
installed soon.
Security on Trains
Each car contains an emergency door release for quick exit in the event of
illegal or suspicious activity. Should passengers need to communicate with the
train operator, they can use intercoms that are located in every car. Stations
have public address systems to make announcements regarding train problems
or issues.
Secured Perimeters
Chain-link and barbed-wire fences exist along all right-of-way areas and
pedestrian bridges. In addition, BART security personnel have taken
precautions against intrusion through the installation of roll-up doors, gates,
stainless steel doors, and motorized shutters at all station entrances and exits.
An intrusion alarm system protects all restricted gates and doors to the system,
further reducing the likelihood of penetration. Shrubbery and landscaping are
kept to a minimum at all points along the system, thereby minimizing the
likelihood of hidden or concealed illegal activity. As a result of these combined
efforts, unauthorized entry into the BART system is difficult to carry out
without going through significant effort.
Vulnerability
The Control Center at Oakland manages, oversees, and troubleshoots all
movements and related issues as well as the camera monitoring system. With
just a few key personnel, the facility can oversee virtually all sensitive areas of
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the system. Nevertheless, there is no backup to the Control Center, which is
considered a weak spot for the system.
Without an alternative site, there is the pressing question of what would
happen to BART in the event of a shutdown at the Oakland Control Center,
whether it were caused by earthquake, flood, or any other disaster. Thus, the
system’s nerve center remains its most vulnerable sector. This condition causes
concern, if not profound anxiety, among agency officials.
Needs
The allocation of federal and state transportation funding in California is
subject to planning and action by agencies composed of elected city and
county officials. In the San Francisco Bay Area, each county’s Congestion
Management Agency determines local priorities, and the Metropolitan
Transportation Commission makes the final decisions for the region. Elected
BART officials are not members of the voting boards of these agencies. Thus,
vital funding decisions affecting BART depend on the good will and
consideration of persons with potentially competing priorities. As a property-
tax-funded special district, BART is constrained by Proposition 13 with respect
to tax increases. Because of these limits and uncertainties, BART leaders hope
the federal government will establish funding categories specifically for
systems like BART.
Regardless of future assistance from the federal and/or state governments, one
fact will remain clear: The safety of BART will only become more important
as larger and larger numbers of Bay Area residents come to rely upon the
transportation system.
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THE TOKYO, MARCH 20, 1995, SUBWAY SARIN ATTACK
On March 20, 1995, members of the Japanese religious cult Aum Shinrikyo
released sarin (nerve gas) on Tokyo’s subways, killing 12 persons and making
thousands of others ill. It was the first large-scale use of a poison gas by a
nongovernment group and, although Aum Shinrikyo previously had not been
identified as a terrorist group in the traditional sense of that term, the incident
was promptly labeled an act of terrorism. Seen as a precedent-setting event, the
attack fueled fears that future terrorists would employ chemical weapons, and
it added impetus to government programs to prepare for such contingencies.
The incident also raised new problems for those charged with the security of
public transportation. Japanese authorities greatly increased security
immediately after the incident, although few security innovations were
introduced. Instead, police concentrated on neutralizing the suspected source
of the attackthe Aum sect. The following case study is based on published
accounts plus the author’s discussions with officials in Japan’s Ministry of
Transportation and National Police Agency, and Tokyo’s Metropolitan Police
Department.6
TOKYO’S SUBWAYS
Tokyo’s vast subway network comprises two separate subway systems. The
TRTA, also known as TEITO or Eiden Lines, is the older and larger system. It
began operations in 1927 and currently runs 1,677 motor cars and 536 trailer
cars over eight lines with a total mileage of 154.6 kilometers (96 miles). Three
of its linesMarunouchi, Hibiya, and Chiyodawere the targets of the 1995
chemical attack. The second system, the TOEI, is run by the municipal
government. It operates 524 cars on four lines with a total mileage of
64.3 kilometers (40 miles). In addition, Japan Rail operates an extensive
6 The most thorough published accounts are those provided in David Kaplan and Andrew
Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of Aum (London: Arrow
Books Limited, 1996) and Haruki Murakami, Underground: The Tokyo Gas Attack & the
Japanese Psyche (London: The Harvill Press, 2000). See also Kaplan’s excellent chapter
“Aum Shinrikyo (1995)” in Jonathan B. Tucker (ed.) Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of
Chemical and Biological Weapons (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2000) pp 207-26;
D.W. Brackett, Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo (New York: Weatherhill, Inc. 1996);
National Police Agency (Japan), Aum Shinrikyo: An Alarming Report on the Terrorist Group’s
Organization and Activities, 1995; and The Japan Times Special Report, Terror in the Heart of
Japan: The Aum Shinrikyo Doomsday Cult (Tokyo: The Japan Times Ltd., 1995).
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commuter network, and the adjoining city of Yokohama has its own two
subway lines.
The combined system is extensive, rapid, and clean. A 1998 study of public
transportation in four citiesLondon, Paris, New York, and Tokyorated
Tokyo as the best ride, with a perfect 100 percent record for punctuality during
peak hours. Keeping the trains running on time was a factor in the response to
the March 20 chemical attack.
Public transportation is vital in the huge metropolitan area of Tokyo. Millions
use it daily, encouraged by the fact that 86 percent of Japanese companies pay
the full travel costs of their employees. Without its subways, the city would
stop. During peak hours the subways are fantastically overcrowded, with
station staff sometimes literally pushing passengers into the cars. This too may
have been a factor on March 20. The attack took place at the height of the
morning rush hour, when passengers are accustomed to boarding the trains
rapidly, without necessarily heeding what is going on. This not only provided
concealment for the attackers, but also meant that even as ill passengers were
stumbling off the contaminated coaches, new passengers were shoving their
way on board. Within minutes, more than a thousand people had been exposed
to the poison gas.
AUM SHINRIKYO
The Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth) cult was established in 1987 by Shoko
Asahara, a con man guru who claimed supernatural powers. Despite the
improbability of his boasts, which included levitation and miraculous cures,
the cult quickly grew into an organization of 10,000 members seeking spiritual
comfort, New Age enlightenment, and freedom from personal choice.
Organized along quasi-government lines, with its own ministries and
departments, all under the Supreme Leader Asahara, the empire included a
diverse business conglomerate bringing the cult an estimated net worth
exceeding $2 billion. Religious cults of this type are not unusual in either
primitive or advanced industrial societies, but Aum Shinrikyo was noteworthy
in combining its apocalyptic world view (also not uncommon in cults), a
fascination with weapons of mass destruction, an ability to recruit scientists,
and access to immense financial resources.
Visions of a violent end drove the cult’s members. To them, the evidence was
clear—the return of Halley’s comet, political developments in Russia, the
unification of Europe, and numerous sightings of UFOs all confirmed that the
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end was near. According to Asahara, Armageddon would occur in 2001 or
1999; he later moved the date forward to 1997. Before then, sect members
believed, the cult would become more powerful than the state. Aum’s army
would invade the Holy Land. The apocalypse would follow. Mount Fuji would
explode. Japan would sink into the sea. Asahara would die, but those who
adhered to his beliefs would survive, while those who did not would perish in
the flames of hell.
Much of the cult’s intrinsic paranoia reflected the hypochondriac paranoid
fantasies of its supreme leader, who claimed that he and his followers were
themselves being attacked by chemical weapons. To battle against its
numerous enemies and to prepare for its role in the fantastical future imagined
by its members required that the cult obtain the most advanced weapons of
mass destruction. That, in turn, required scientists, technicians, secret
laboratories, front companies, a covert arms acquisition program, international
connections, and huge sums of cash.
Aum’s takeover of Japan was to begin with a coup. Units of Aum followers,
dressed in the uniforms of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces—some of them
actually soldiers who had been recruited into the sect—would seize physical
control of the government. The sect’s weapons of mass destruction then would
deter any counterattack.
EXPERIMENTS WITH EXOTIC WEAPONS
Cult technicians experimented with a variety of biological and chemical
substances. Notes from one of the sect’s officials also suggest that they may
have tried to purchase a nuclear warhead in Russia; although they failed in that
endeavor, they did acquire other Russian military equipment. Working in well-
equipped laboratories, supported by a well-financed worldwide purchasing
structure, Aum’s corps of scientists unquestioningly sought to implement the
mad schemes of the supreme leader. They contemplated vaporizing Japan’s
royal family with a laser on the occasion of the prince’s wedding. Unable to
mount that attack, they instead sprayed central Tokyo with botulinum toxin on
the prince’s wedding day. It is not known whether the city’s physicians treated
a greater number of patients with unusual symptoms, but no deaths occurred
and no one noticed. In another try, they sprayed the city with anthrax from a
tall building in Tokyo. Again nothing happened, this time because they had not
incubated the spores properly. They also tried to obtain samples of Q Fever and
the Ebola virus in Africa. Overall, their biological warfare program was
unsuccessful.
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They had better results in developing chemical weapons and constructed a
clandestine plant capable of producing a highly impure version of sarin, a
nerve agent first developed by German scientists. On June 27, 1994, the Aum
scientists launched their first sarin attack in the town of Matsumoto, chosen
because the cult had a land dispute with local authorities. The cult’s technicians
had rigged a refrigerated delivery truck with a crude atomizing system and
loaded it with 44 pounds of sarin, which they dispersed at night. The attack
resulted in seven deaths and more than 200 injuries. By November 1994,
police had diagnosed the cause as sarin, but initially did not suspect Aum.
Instead, authorities focused on a local resident who they alleged had
accidentally produced a sarin-like substance in the course of making his own
herbicides.
Further incidents of chemical contamination resulting from accidents at the
cult’s chemical plant on Mount Fuji might have alerted authorities to the sect’s
activities, but Japan’s decentralized policing structure and reluctance to
interfere with religious groups hampered investigations. Gradually, however,
police began piecing together the various investigations of local complaints,
mysterious disappearances, suspected murders, and the strange chemical
purchases of the cult through its various front companies. Determined to push
the investigation, police planned a nationwide search of Aum’s facilities, using
the cult’s suspected involvement in a kidnapping as a basis for the action.
(Japanese law did not prohibit the mere possession of sarin until April 1995.)
With the authorities closing in, Aum planned a devastating counterattack.
THE ATTACK
The cult’s first scheme involved a laser gun—this time Aum would destroy
Tokyo’s police headquarters or at least blind its occupants; but when attempts
to build or buy a laser of sufficient power failed, Aum’s scientists went back to
gas. On March 5, 1995, 11 commuters on a train in Yokohama were
hospitalized as a result of mysterious fumes that swept through the train. It was
a rehearsal for the cult’s next planned assault in Tokyo. Again, the group tried
botulism. The deadly toxin was to be placed in dispensers inside briefcases that
contained small electric fans to disperse the material. Three of these devices
were left on station platforms, where they would be triggered by the vibrations
of passing trains. The focus of the attack was Tokyo’s Kasumigaseki Station,
the one closest to police headquarters, but it failed because someone in the cult
had failed to load the toxin into the containers. Even had pangs of conscience
or mere incompetence not foiled the attack, its effect would have been limited
by the simple fact that Tokyo’s subways are kept extremely tidy. All three
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abandoned briefcases were promptly noticed and collected by the
stationmasters.
With its spies now reporting that police intended to raid Aum’s facilities
throughout Japan on March 21, Aum switched to the more reliable sarin. The
dispersal method was crude. The hastily concocted sarin was loaded into
homemade plastic bags, each containing about 20 ounces of the solution. Each
member of the team would carry two or three bags onto the train, puncture
them with a sharpened umbrella, and escape. The sarin would slowly seep out
and vaporize into a deadly mist.
The initial plan called for 12 bags, but there was enough sarin for only 11.
Instead of attacking the entire subway system, the five attackers aimed at the
three lines converging at the Kasumigaseki Station. They scheduled the attack
for 8 A.M. to coincide with the morning commute, when the trains were
especially crowded. They hoped to kill hundreds of Tokyo’s police officers as
they traveled to work, but the inevitability of thousand of civilian casualties
was not a constraint.
Boarding the trains at different stations, the five attackers succeeded in
puncturing the bags within a few minutes of each other and escaping into the
crowd. By 8:10 A.M., the attack was complete. Three subway lines and 16
stations were affected.
One attacker, wearing a surgical mask like those commonly seen in Japan to
prevent the spread of germs, boarded a southwestbound train on Chiyoda Line
at 7:48 A.M. He punctured only one of the two bags of sarin he carried at the
Shin-ochanomizu Station, then left the train and fled to a waiting automobile
driven by an accomplice. The train went on to the Kasumigaseki, where two
station attendants died after taking the bags from the train, then to the Kokkai-
gijidomae Station, where all the passengers were evacuated. In addition to the
two dead, 231 people were seriously injured on this drop.
Meanwhile, another man boarded the westbound Marunouchi Line at the
Ikebukuro Station. Hesitating, he briefly got off the train at the Myogadani (or
Korakuen) Station, then, overcoming his doubts, reboarded another coach on
the same train. When the train reached Ochanomizu Station, he punctured the
two bags and fled to a waiting car. However, he had inhaled some of the fumes
himself and, in the car, injected himself with atropine, which all the attackers
carried. As the train continued, passengers in the contaminated car began to
feel ill and spilled out into the stations of central Tokyo. In the morning rush
The Tokyo, March 20, 1995, Subway Sarin Attack
Mineta Transportation Institute
54
hour, the trains usually ran fairly empty after the last downtown stops. When
the train reached the Nakano-sakaye, only two unconscious passengers, a man
and a woman, were left on the coach. The station attendant thought at first it
had been a double love-suicide. Then, spotting the two plastic pouches, he
picked them up and put them on the platform. Fortunately, he was wearing the
white nylon uniform gloves that all station attendants wear, and therefore did
not feel the effects of the sarin until later. With the help of the train’s driver and
conductor, neither of whom had any idea what had taken place, the two
passengers were carried off the train, which resumed its run to the other end of
the line at Ogikubo. There, other attendants mopped the floor of the train as it
reversed for its eastbound run. The fumes, however, caused the cleaning crew
and the new load of passengers to become ill. Something clearly was wrong on
the train, and two stops later it was removed from service. One passenger died
and 358 persons were seriously injured.
The third attacker had boarded an eastbound train on the Manouchi Line at
Shinjuku Station, punctured his bags five stops later, and left the train at
Yotsuya Station. In his haste, however, he punctured only one of the two bags
he dropped on the floor, and that one spilled it contents very slowly. As a
result, fewer people became ill. At the end of the line in Ikeburo, the train was
evacuated and searched, but the attendants missed the two packets and the train
was reboarded and sent on its westbound run. More passengers became ill as
the contents of the bag slowly seeped out onto the floor. At the train’s fourth
stop, a station attendant found the bags and removed them. The contaminated
train, however, continued its run to the end of the line, where it reversed again
for another eastbound run. It was not until 9:27, one hour and forty minutes
after the attacker punctured the sarin-filled packet, that the train was taken out
of service. Two hundred persons were seriously injured.
The fourth attacker boarded a northeastbound train on the Hibiya Line at the
Noka-meguro Station. He punctured his bags at the next station and left the
train. He, too, suffered the effects of minor contamination. Passengers quickly
became ill and began to spill out of the train at each subsequent stop. By the
time the train reached Kasumigaseki Station, ground zero of the attack, its first
coach was empty; passengers on the remaining cars were evacuated. One
person died, 532 were seriously injured.
The fifth attacker carried three packets of sarin. At 7:43, he boarded a
southwestbound train on the Hibiya Line. At Akihabara Station, two stops
later, he punctured his three bags and left the train. Passengers immediately
began to feel ill. Spotting the leaking newspaper-wrapped parcel, one
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passenger kicked it onto the platform at Kodemmacho, where it quickly filled
the station with deadly fumes. Four persons died there. More violently ill
passengers spilled out at each stop until one person pressed the emergency
button at 8:10 A.M. and the train halted at Tsukiji. The driver reported that
something seemed to have exploded in the train, and word of an explosion at
Tsukiji Station spread to the other stations. Attendants at the station, however,
quickly recognized the problem as poison gas and evacuated the station.
Twenty-five minutes later, at 8:35, the central subway authority shut down the
entire Hibiya Line and evacuated all remaining passengers and personnel.
Eight people died and 175 were seriously injured.
Many passengers reported that they became aware of foul-smelling fumes.
(Sarin itself is odorless, but the cult’s brew contained numerous impurities.)
Some victims immediately fell to the ground, writhing in convulsions. Others,
choking, coughing, foaming at the mouth, their vision rapidly fading,
staggered off the trains and toward the exits. As the trains continued on their
course, at each stop disgorging more victims, the streets above rapidly filled
with thousands of casualties. Some, who received only a whiff of the poison,
went on to work feeling ill, to be sent to hospitals later in the day as their
symptoms worsened.
Fumes from the subway began wafting up from station entrances and through
the vents to street level, making more persons ill. (Authorities subsequently
contemplated raising street-level vents to above pedestrian height.) Sarin is
heavier than air and hugs the ground, but the cult’s mixture contained other
noxious ingredients. Passengers who had stepped on or crawled through the
liquid also carried the sarin to street level. Still more people fell ill. Casualties
climbed past the 3,000 mark.
THE IMMEDIATE RESPONSE
Police, fire, and medical crews responded rapidly to the disaster. Too few
ambulances were available, so police vans were used to ferry hundreds of
victims to hospitals. Rescue of those still in the stations was more difficult.
Rushing into the underground stations, the first responders themselves became
ill. Paramedics and emergency room staffs, exposed to clothing contaminated
with sarin, also fell ill.
Initially, it was unclear exactly what had happened. The first emergency calls
to the authorities came in at 8:20 A.M., with the initial reports indicating
explosives, but the injuries appeared to come from some kind of fumes. As
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reports from subway stations and first responders multiplied, it became clear to
authorities that they were not dealing with an explosion or series of explosions,
but with some type of gas. Sarin was immediately suspected, but then rejected;
if the deadly nerve gas were the cause, there should have been many more
deaths. By 10:30 A.M., however, sarin was identified as the cause.
Subsequently, police capabilities to analyze chemical substances were
improved.
Fortunately, the police had been planning to search Aum Shinrikyo’s facilities
on March 22. Anticipating that they might encounter laboratories with sarin,
the police trained for dealing with nerve gas. They had requested protective
masks and clothing from the military and had 30 of these suits on hand in
Tokyo at the time of the subway attack.
Hospitals, expecting to treat people for burns and smoke, instead had to deal
with some type of chemical poisoning, but the symptoms mystified emergency
room crews. According to one account, at 10:30 A.M., more than two hours
after the attack, a military doctor treating the casualties concluded that the
culprit was sarin and ordered that atropine be administered. However, Dr.
Nobuo Yanagisawa, Head of the School of Medicine at Shinshu University,
says that by shortly after 9 A.M., it was clear even from televised interviews of
victims that the problem was oganophosphorus toxicity, a nerve gas like that
used in the attack at Matsumoto. On his desk was a copy of the Matsumoto
Sarin Incident Report, which had not yet been distributed. Dr. Yanagisawa and
his colleagues began telephoning Tokyo hospitals and faxing copies of the
report to emergency rooms. He heard later, however, that physicians at St.
Lukes, one of major treatment centers, were still looking for clues to the toxin
at 11 A.M.
Had Aum’s hastily mixed batch of sarin contained fewer impurities, the death
toll would have been in the hundreds, perhaps thousands. As it turned out, only
12 persons died; 5,500 is the number given as those treated at hospitals.
However, this is not entirely certain. Aum’s scientists also may have laced the
sarin with a chemical agent to slow vaporization, not only to protect
themselves and the attackers against instant death but also to achieve greater
effects. A more lethal version that killed instantaneously might have reduced
exposures—people likely would not board a coach filled with corpses. It was
only because the effects were not instantaneous that more people got on the
contaminated coaches. Was lethality a trade-off for quantity?
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Of the more than 5,000 people who became ill, only 26 percent, about 1,300,
were treated for actual exposure to the gas; approximately 74 percent were
diagnosed as suffering only from psychologically induced symptoms or
concerns. More than a hundred persons showed up at hospitals in the following
weeks suffering from the effects of nerve gas to which they had been exposed
on March 20. Japanese prosecutors listed the official number of injuries at
3,398. Murakami’s account says that 1,596 were injured seriously.
By 1:30 P.M., police wearing gas masks and protective clothing borrowed from
the military had identified and recovered the plastic bags and began
decontaminating the stations. The Self-Defense Forces sent 60 chemical
warfare experts and 105 infantry to assist in the cleanup. Despite the
magnitude of the disaster, by late afternoon, Tokyo’s subway system was
operating again.
The Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department, which had taken charge of the
rescue operation, mobilized 10,000 additional police officers to increase
security at and around locations where crowds gathered, including subway
stations, major shopping areas near train stations and government buildings,
and sports arenas. The public, which quickly had learned that nerve gas had
been used in the attack, was warned not to approach and touch suspicious
objects found abandoned, but to report such discoveries to police immediately.
Efforts against the Aum sect, which authorities immediately suspected, were
accelerated, although there were public complaints that police were not
moving fast enough. The sect had to be linked to the attack—suspicion alone
was not enough. Within two days of the incident, however, 2,500 officers of
the Metropolitan Police searched the sect’s offices and facilities in Tokyo and
raided its industrial headquarters near Mount Fuji on suspicion of kidnapping.
Police units from all parts of the country assisted the Tokyo police in
surrounding other Aum facilities and keeping them under surveillance.
Although Aum spokesmen, interviewed frequently on television, denied that
the cult had anything to with the attack, the haul from the continuing police
searches provided mounting evidence of the group’s involvement with
chemical weapons; however, no arrests were made until early April. By mid-
April, more than a hundred cult members were in custody, but none was
immediately charged with the sarin attack.
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FURTHER INCIDENTS
Cult members still at large fought back. On March 30, a gunman attempted to
assassinate the chief of the National Police Agency. Although badly wounded,
the chief survived. A caller later warned that if the investigation of Aum did
not stop, more police would die. The next target, said the caller, would be the
head of the Tokyo police. The caller’s voice later was identified as that of a cult
member.
April 15, a date that Asahara had predicted would bring catastrophe to Japan,
brought high anxiety to the nation. Police patrols were increased further.
Chemical warfare units remained on alert. Hospitals stood ready. Believing a
rumor that sect members might poison the water supply, people filled their
bathtubs and waited, but the day passed without incident.
On April 19, it briefly appeared that the cult had struck again as choking,
blinded commuters spilled out of the Yokohama Station. Police and chemical
warfare units responded instantly. More than 600 persons were hospitalized.
This time, however, the fumes were not deadly sarin but only mace, and the
perpetrator turned out to be not a soldier of the Aum sect, but a lone petty
gangster with serious mental problems.
The cult struck next on April 23. Its objective was not mass murder but the
elimination of its own “chief scientist,” who was stabbed to death in front of
television cameras. He was still at large because the police could not yet make
a supportable connection between Aum’s activities and the Tokyo attack. Had
he been in custody and talked, he, of all the cult members, could have provided
the most complete picture of Aum’s secret weapons program.
May 5 was Children’s Day in Japan, a traditional occasion for family outings.
Despite the atmosphere of fear that prevailed, the subways were packed,
especially Shinjinku Station, which encompasses a vast underground shopping
mall. At 7:40 P.M., the station’s staff responded to a fire in a public restroom,
but the burning bag that caused the fire began to emit choking fumes. The staff
retreated until firemen with breathing apparatus arrived to douse the flames.
Investigators discovered that the package contained two condoms, one filled
with sodium cyanide, the other with sulfuric acid. Had the device worked as
planned, the acid would have eaten through the condom to mix with the
sodium cyanide, producing hydrogen cyanide gas, the same substance used to
murder millions of Jews in the Nazi death camps. The gas then would have
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entered the ventilation system and spread to the nearby train platforms. Police
calculated that the infernal device contained enough chemicals to kill 20,000
people.
On May 16, cult members attempted to assassinate the Tokyo Metropolitan
Governor with a parcel bomb. The bomb exploded in the governor’s office,
seriously injuring his secretary.
Japan’s nerves were rattled again in June, when an individual claiming to be an
Aum sect member hijacked an All Nippon Airways 747 by threatening to
puncture a clear bag that he claimed contained sarin. After 15 hours of
negotiations, police stormed the plane. The man was not a sect member, and
the bag contained only water.
By June, police had rounded up hundreds of sect members including Asahara
himself, who was arrested on May 16. Working on information gained through
interrogation, the authorities desperately sought to cripple the sect’s scientific
capability, dismantle its laboratories, and recover its dangerous chemical
stockpile before further attacks occurred.
The last attacks occurred on July 4, with four more attempted gas attacks on
Tokyo’s subways. Two attacks involved condoms filled with chemicals to
produce hydrogen cyanide, as in the attack at Shinjinku. None of the devices
worked, but for thousands of people it was a narrow escape.
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT
“Saranoia” was the term used to describe Japan’s psychological state during
the spring and summer of 1995. In less than four months, there had been seven
spectacular attacks. In addition, numerous false alarms, hoax threats, and
rumors rattled Japan in the wake of the March 20 attack. Two attacks—the
mace attack at Yokohama Station and the ANA hijacking—were not carried
out by sect members, but by mentally disturbed individuals who had been
inspired by the headlines. Two more attacks were aimed at individuals: the
attempted murder of the National Police Agency’s chief and the silencing of
the Aum sect’s own scientist. The remaining three attacks were calculated to
kill thousands of people. Subsequent investigations revealed that there had
been 17 biological and chemical attacks carried out by the sect, some of which
did not work or, at the time, were not seen to be connected.
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Bad chemistry, technical incompetence, possibly pangs of conscience, and
simple good luck prevented tragedy from becoming national catastrophe.
However, the fact that tens of thousands of people had narrowly escaped death
provided little psychological comfort. Nerves were on edge as the enormity of
the sect’s evil intentions and covert capabilities came to light.
Declines in train ridership, however, were only temporary. Japan depends on
its public transportation system, especially its network of trains and subways.
Alternatives are unavailable. Private auto travel is not a viable substitute. Taxi
use increased, but taxis in Japan are extremely expensive and, at any rate,
could not handle the extra volume. Six million passengers ride Tokyo’s
subways daily; with 1.6 million entering or exiting Shinjinku Station. For
commuters, life went on.
The nation’s fear turned to impatience with authorities. Although deeply
respectful of individual rights and especially tolerant of religious diversity,
people wanted the Aum sect rounded up and done with and expressed anger at
police for proceeding too slowly. The police strategy of focusing on
dismantling the sect rather than pretending that Japan’s vast, vulnerable public
transportation system realistically could be protected was correct, but it
required building a solid case that the Aum’s chemists and chemistry were
responsible for the Tokyo attack, and that took time.
Moreover, dealing with an organization of 10,000 members is not the same as
dealing with a small conspiracy. The prompt arrest of Timothy McVeigh
following the Oklahoma City bombing, which occurred shortly after the Tokyo
attack, was the result of luck. Had the Oklahoma bombing been the act of a
larger militia group, the task of U.S. authorities would have been much greater.
Membership alone is not a cause for arrest. It would have taken time to
determine responsibility and build cases against those who participated in the
attack as well as those who authored it. As it turned out, it took only 48 hours
to strike a devastating blow to the Aum sect, and it took eight to ten weeks for
Japan’s police to round up its ringleaders. Justice in Japan, however, moves
slowly. Trials continued into the year 2000.
The Tokyo attack reverberated beyond Japan. It confirmed what many analysts
of violence had feared—that terrorists seeking high body counts would move
beyond truck bombs into the realm of chemical and biological weapons.
Although no other terrorists have attempted to carry out attacks like the one in
Tokyo, governments have devoted increasing resources to dealing with the
possibility. Prior to March 1995, a large-scale chemical attack on a public
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transportation system was considered a remote threat. Today, it is a scenario for
which emergency response crews routinely train.
LESSONS LEARNED
It does not appear that the Tokyo subway system was operating under any
special alert on March 20. If true, this is curious given the previous Yokohama
and Kasumigaseki attempts that might have provided early warning. The
earlier Matsumoto incident also was ignored. An alert status could have
facilitated a more rapid response.
It is difficult to identify any security measures that would have prevented the
attack. An increased police presence might have had some deterrent value, but
sect members were determined. The millions of people using Tokyo’s vast
subway system daily would have overwhelmed attempts at passenger
screening. Nor did increased security measures prevent further chemical
attacks on Tokyo subways.
Greater use of closed-circuit television might have contributed to a deterrent
effect, but the attackers knew that cameras were present and were not deterred.
Subsequent examination of the videotapes showed that one of the five
attackers on March 20 was caught by a surveillance camera as he fled the
station; the other four were not noted. Moreover, the sarin-filled bags were not
punctured in the stations, but aboard trains packed with commuters where there
were no cameras and the crowds made visual surveillance extremely difficult.
Finally, the attackers were not only highly motivated but, as fugitives, expected
to be protected by a powerful organization.
Could the trains have been stopped sooner? Explosions are finite events
limited in time and space; thus they are easier to address than chemical attacks,
which may produce ongoing effects and where it may not be apparent
immediately what is going on. It took at least a few minutes for the effects of
the sarin to be felt, trains to reach the first station after the bags were
punctured, and ill passengers to begin stumbling off. By the time a problem
was apparent at one station, the train would be on its way to its next stop. In
fact, it would take several stops before it was realized that the trains had
become the carriers of a dangerous chemical. This is a key issue. Prevention is
not a realistic goal, and response to an attack that causes large-scale casualties,
especially one involving chemical substances, is the responsibility of
emergency services; therefore, the role of the transportation operating
authority in such an attack is reduced to a narrow band between the occurrence
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of the event and the response by public authorities. The key decision that the
operating agency may be called upon to make is when to shut down and
evacuate part or all of the system.
Until reliable detection and identification technology can be deployed,
transportation authorities will be forced to rely upon disparate and potentially
erroneous accounts of events, augmented by what they can see with closed-
circuit television. It will not be easy to grasp the overall picture, and public
transportation operators are reluctant to shut down. Almost all public
transportation emergency planning is geared toward keeping the system going,
minimizing disruption, or rapidly restoring service if it is shut down
somewhere.
In the case of the Tokyo attack, station attendants were the first to note the
apparent effects, people becoming ill. All five attacks were completed by 8:10,
but even before then, attendants observed violently ill passengers exiting the
trains as they approached Tokyo’s Kasumigaseki Station. Drivers apparently
were not aware of what was happening on their trains. Attendants noted
noxious odors, removed passengers, picked up packets, and mopped floors—
all hurriedly so as not to delay trains unduly and snarl the system. Some
personnel thought it might have been an explosion or a lovers’ suicide; others
quickly concluded poison gas.
We do not know what was reported, when it was reported, or how the operating
authority compiled and interpreted the reports, but the trains went on running.
It was above ground, as the stations in central Tokyo began to disgorge
hundreds of violently ill passengers, that the magnitude of the problem became
so visible. Even if the attendants at each station promptly and accurately
reported the situation, it would take several more minutes to discern that the
subway lines appeared to be under a major coordinated assault. By that time,
most of the damage was done. It is not clear that faster action would have
reduced casualties significantly; however, one can wonder whether delays of
20 minutes, or more than an hour in the case of the Marunouchi train, were
warranted.
It cannot be argued that a more lethal form of sarin in Tokyo would have killed
most of the 1,200 to 1,500 persons exposed to the gas, since a rapid
accumulation of corpses probably would have sent passengers running from
the stations instead of boarding contaminated trains. However, should a future
attack occur, transportation system operators could find themselves in a
situation where people are becoming ill, and the longer the system continues to
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run, the more people will become ill. In such circumstances, rapid
communication, rapid diagnosis that turns tactical intelligence into a strategic
assessment, and a willingness to shut down and evacuate despite obvious
disincentives to do so, are essential. Minutes will count.
Systemwide surveillance cameras might have assisted train officials in
assessing the situation more rapidly, shutting down the trains carrying the
lethal gas, and advising others at stations in back and in front of the affected
trains to evacuate immediately. This kind of remote diagnosis also would have
been useful in directing rescue operations.
CCTV surveillance capabilities subsequently were increased. Alarms were also
installed in public restrooms to ensure prompt response to incidents like the
May 5 cyanide attack.
To be effective, CCTV, alarms, and reports from on-scene personnel must be
integrated and made part of protocols and response procedures that, while
attempting to minimize disruptions, indicate circumstances in which temporary
shutdown is the safest course of action—waiting for an order from public
authorities may take too long. This is an operator responsibility that merits
further examination.
Gas masks, along with established procedures and training, would have been
useful to subway employees, especially station staff. They were, and always
will be, the first responders. They deserve training. At the least, these would
have reduced their chances of becoming casualties themselves. Greater
availability of gas masks and protective clothing also would have facilitated
rescue.
Prompt detection (alarms to signal the presence of gas) and faster identification
of the substance used in the attempted mass killing would have facilitated
treatment. For two hours, emergency room crews remained baffled by the
symptoms, despite the prior event in Matsumoto. This problem can be
addressed with technology and training of hospital staff; it is a component of
overall security, but not the specific responsibility of transport security. Since
the Tokyo attack, detection, identification, and rapid diagnosis technology
have become a priority in government research programs.
Coordination was improved among Japan’s various police agencies and
between the police and the military, the latter of which has the capability to
deal with large-scale incidents involving chemical or biological substances.
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The Ministry of Transport has set up an Accident Investigation Panel to
investigate and analyze railway accidents and develop countermeasures.
Police also recognized the necessity of improving their capability to analyze
and identify biological pathogens and chemicals that might be used in
chemical attacks or to fabricate chemical weapons. Connecting the sarin used
in the Tokyo attack with the chemicals found at Aum’s facilities was a
prerequisite to successful prosecution.
The most effective security measure, however, was exactly what the Japanese
police didlaunching an all-out offensive against the group suspected of the
attack.
ISSUES RAISED DURING THE ATTACK
The March and subsequent attacks on the Tokyo and Yokohama subways raise
a number of security issues. Some are general; some apply specifically to the
unique circumstances of a chemical attack. These include:
• Contingency planning for large-scale disasters, accidental or humanmade.
• Chemical/biological preparedness. The March 20 sarin attack was
unprecedented, but chemical and biological attacks now must be accepted
as a possible event in security planning.
• Coordination between transport operators and public authorities.
• On-going threat analysis to detect an increased threat.
• The limitations of physical security.
• The utility of detection and identification technologies which, if
available, may provide immediate warning of a lethal contaminant and its
nature.
• The utility of on-board CCTV, which can alert train drivers to the nature
of the problem and facilitate prompt diagnosis by central management.
• The utility of CCTV at subway stations, which can further aid diagnosis.
• The utility of CCTV coverage of the aboveground area around station
entrances, which may show the accumulation of casualties and thus aid
diagnosis.
• Anticipation of multiple attacks or a rolling contamination in
contingency planning.
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• The necessity of rapid diagnosis.
• Computerized modeling of air flows and dispersal in stations and
tunnels to aid in diagnosis, isolation, and evacuation. (The Tokyo subway
system had the capacity to reverse the air flow, if required.)
• The decision-making process for shutdown and evacuation.
• The necessity of staff training—transportation staff will always be the
first responders and also figure among the casualties.
• The possible utility of special apparatus, that is, gas masks, for train
staff.
• The availability of airtight containers to hold suspicious objects and stop
contamination.
• The development of some type of sealing foam or spray-on substance
that will neutralize suspicious puddles or wet spots.
• Guidance for immediate, on-site treatment of victims—can train staff
perform any useful first aid for victims of chemical attacks?
• Decontamination, clean-up, and all-clear signals.
• The recovery of transport operations.
• The restoration of passenger confidence.
The Aum Shinrikyo attack stands out as the collection of the most traumatic
terrorism events ever to strike surface transportation. The lessons learned from
the attacks and their management may help authorities worldwide respond to
future attacks.
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A CHRONOLOGY OF RECENT TERRORIST ATTACKS
AND OTHER SERIOUS INCIDENTS OF CRIME
INVOLVING PUBLIC SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
SYSTEMS
(JULY 1, 1997 - DECEMBER 31, 2000)
INTRODUCTION
Only by understanding the threat can we develop effective security measures.
Although the United States has been largely spared the kind of terrorist
campaigns waged against public surface transportation in places like the
United Kingdom, France, and Japan, or that in less-developed countries, this
unfortunately rich history of violence elsewhere can be used better to
understand terrorist tactics, targets, and techniques.
The previous volume of this research effort included a chronology of terrorist
attacks and other significant criminal incidents involving public surface
transportation systems from 1920 to June 30, 1997.7 The following chronology
picks up where the previous one left off, and takes us to the end of the
twentieth century. It includes 195 entries that, since some describe
simultaneous multiple attacks, cover more than 200 incidents. Added to the
631 entries of the previous chronology, some of which were also multiple
events, we now have a database approaching 900 incidents. A series of charts
allows us to identify the patterns of targets, tactics, and locations of the attacks
in the 1997 to 2000 period; pairs to these charts then illustrate the patterns
found in the entire chronology from 1920 to 2000.
The descriptions of the incidents were compiled from published accounts in
the news media, books on terrorism, and terrorism databases maintained by the
U.S. government, the RAND corporation, and the Kroll-O’Gara Company. No
classified or proprietary information is included.
The chronology should be considered representative rather than
comprehensive. Although it is believed to include all the significant incidents,
no claim can be made that the research has captured every event. Thousands of
7 Brian Michael Jenkins, et al. Protecting Surface Transportation Systems and Patrons
from Terrorist Activities, Case Studies of Best Security Practices and a Chronology of
Attacks. San Jose: Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation
Policy Studies, 1997.
A Chronology of Recent Terrorist Attacks and Other Serious Incidents of Crime
Involving Public Surface Transportation Systems
Mineta Transportation Institute
68
incidents of ordinary crime—individual murders, rapes, armed robberies, and
other assaults—are not included. Nor does the chronology report all the many
bomb threats, which are a common headache for transportation system
operators.
The chronology includes guerrilla and terrorist attacks in which the
transportation system or passengers were the principal target. It excludes acts
of warfare, such as aerial bombing or artillery fire.
This addition of 42 months to the original chronology permits us to confirm,
with a database expanded by a third, some of the patterns and trends noted
earlier and to discern possible differences. As we shall see, the patterns in
terms of targets and tactics, for the most part, have remained stable. There are a
few changes in where most of the action is taking place, reflecting shifting
patterns of global conflict, but here, too, much remains as it was in the first
chronology.
There is no apparent increase in the volume of attacks since the publication of
the first chronology. That one noted a significant jump in the 1990s, but this
could have been the result of more complete reporting: 430 attacks were
recorded from January 1991 through June 1997, an average of five a month; a
few more than 200 attacks were recorded from July 1997 through December
2000, roughly the same average.
The overall lethality of these attacks has remained roughly the same. It was
noted in the previous chronology that contemporary terrorists see public
surface transportation as a killing field. Roughly 20 percent of all incidents of
international terrorism involve fatalities: 35 percent of attacks on surface
transportation recorded in the previous chronology and 43 percent of the
incidents recorded in the most recent chronology resulted in fatalities—a
dangerous trend if it continues. Two-thirds of the attacks recorded in the earlier
chronology clearly were intended to kill (bombs in crowded places), whether
or not they succeeded, while 63 percent of the incidents in the current
chronology appear intended to kill. In both the percentage of fatalities and of
attacks intended to kill, one should exercise caution, given the small size of the
more recent chronology—200 events. It appears safer to say that with more
than 800 events in the combined chronologies, about two-thirds were intended
to kill and about 37 percent of the total involved fatalities.
A further indication of lethality is the percentage of incidents with multiple
fatalities. In the current chronology, of the 84 incidents with fatalities,
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74 percent involved more than one fatality and 23 percent involved 10 or more
fatalities.
The distribution of targets shows little change apart from the increase in
attacks on buses, which climbed from 29 percent in the earlier chronology to
41 percent in the current chronology, and the corresponding decline in the
proportion of attacks on subways and trains, which dropped from 27 percent to
22 percent (Figure 1). One possible trend to be noted is the growing number of
terrorist attacks on tourist buses. Looking at the combined chronologies in
Figure 2, however, one still sees a roughly even split between attacks on rail
systems (trains, subways, stations, and rails) and bus systems (buses of all
types and bus depots).
Tactics also show few changes. Even with an incomplete count of bomb
threats, bombings continue to predominate (Figure 3). Overall, bombings
account for 60 percent of all incidents from 1920 to 2000; ambushes and armed
assaults, 11 percent; standoff attacks, 9 percent; hostage situations, 5 percent;
and mechanical sabotage, 5 percent (Figure 4).
India and Pakistan still account for the most incidents with fatalities in the
current chronology. Algeria remains near the top. Turkey and Russia have
been replaced in the rankings by Sri Lanka and the Philippines (Figures 5 and
6). Overall, India, Pakistan, Algeria, and Sri Lanka have seen the most
violence (Figures 7 and 8).
The chronology is misleading in one important sense. By definition, it includes
only attacks on public surface transportation, thereby excluding terrorist
attacks involving other targets. In many instances, the attacks listed here refer
to ongoing conflicts—civil wars, guerrilla wars, terrorist campaigns. These
include Naga tribesmen and Assam separatists in northeastern India; Kashmiri
and Sikh separatists in northwest India; Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka; Marxist
guerrillas and Islamic separatists in the Philippines; the sectarian violence in
Pakistan; Chechen rebels in the southern Caucasus of Russia; Palestinians in
the Israeli-occupied territories; Islamic extremists in Algeria and Egypt;
Casamance separatists in Senegal; the IRA in the United Kingdom; and the
civil war in Colombia. Often these combatants bring their violence to the
capital cities seeking international attention and reminding complacent
populations that they will have no peace while distant wars rage.
Attacks on public transportation are only one facet of these conflicts. Under the
circumstances, they are to be expected. The threat level is high. The violence is
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ferocious. Governments and transportation operators are obliged to take
extraordinary measures that would be difficult to justify outside these conflict
zones.
Leaving out countries with ongoing civil wars, guerrilla wars, and long-term
terrorist campaigns would eliminate about two-thirds of the incidents for the
period covered in this chronology and give us a different picture of the threat.
Japan and Germany would head the list, followed by China. Bomb threats and
acts of sabotage, extortion, robbery, assaults, and isolated crimes (mentally
deranged hijackers) would predominate. There would be fewer fatalities.
Overall, the threat would be less predictable.
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Figure 1. Targets of Attacks on Public Surface Transportation Systems
(1920 - 2000)
Figure 2. Tactics Used Against Public Transportation Systems
(1920 - 2000)
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Figure 3. Targets on Attacks on Public Surface Transportation Systems
(July 1997 - December 2000)
Figure 4. Tactics Used Against Public Transportation Systems
(July 1977 - December 2000)
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Figure 5. Location of Attacks with Fatalities on Public Surface Transportation
Systems (July 1997 - December 2000)
Figure 6. Location of Attacks with Fatalities on Public Surface Transportation
Systems (1920 - 2000)
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Figure 7. Countries with the Most Fatalities in Attacks on Public Surface
Transportation Systems (July 1997 - December 2000)
Figure 8. Countries with the Most Fatalities in Attacks on Public Surface
Transportation Systems (1920 - 2000)
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RECENT CHRONOLOGY
Hungary - July 1, 1997 - Firebomb thrown at railway station in Budapest
Suspected organized crime members were believed responsible for a firebomb
thrown at the Kelei railway station that set fire to one of the shops. There were
no injuries. Authorities believed that rival gangs, fighting over turf, were
responsible for this and other bombings in Budapest.
India - July 8, 1997 - Bomb on train kills 36
A bomb planted under the floor exploded on a crowded passenger train in the
state of Punjab, killing 36 and injuring at least 70 others. Although no group
claimed responsibility, authorities suspected Sikh or Kashmiri separatists.
Israel - July 11, 1997 - Roadside bomb attack on bus
A bomb exploded as a bus carrying Jewish seminary students passed. No one
was injured on the bus, but two nearby policemen suffered wounds.
Macau - July 11, 1997 - Bomb on tourist bus
Police discovered a bomb underneath a tourist bus outside a hotel. After
removing the deadly parcel, bomb squad authorities detonated it without
casualties.
India - July 14, 1997 - Two bombs explode on Delhi buses
Six persons were killed and 13 more injured when a bomb exploded on a bus.
A second bomb injured six more persons aboard a commuter bus.
India - August 4, 1997 - Train sabotage injures ten
Ten persons were injured when a train derailed near New Delhi. Police
suspected sabotage.
India - August 4, 1997 - Bomb explodes in passenger train
An incendiary device exploded on a passenger train near Bangalore, India,
wounding 15 persons. The explosion may have been caused unintentionally by
explosives carried by one of the passengers, although authorities remained
suspicious.
Tajkistan - August 5, 1997 - Bomb explodes in bus terminal
A bomb exploded at the bus terminal in Tursunzade, injuring two persons.
Authorities failed to determine a motive for the attack.
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Georgia - August 8, 1997 - Gunmen open fire on bus
One person was killed and three were wounded when masked gunmen opened
fire on a bus. Their motive may have been robbery, according to police
authorities.
Czech Republic - August 21, 1997 - Bomb threat to Prague metro
A bomb threat halted service for three hours on one of Prague’s metro lines.
No bomb was found. This was one of several bomb threats on the Prague metro
in 1997.
India - August 26, 1997 - Bomb explodes under bus
A bomb exploded under a bus in the state of Jammu-Kashmir, wounding 25
persons.
Senegal - August 30, 1997 - Antitank mine explodes under bus
Separatists belonging to the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance
were suspected of responsibility for the detonation of a mine under a bus in the
southern Casamance region of Senegal. Five persons were killed, 10 others
were wounded. The mine may have been intended for passing military
vehicles.
India - September 7, 1997 - Passenger train damaged by bomb
A remotely detonated bomb destroyed a segment of track in Jammu-Kashmir
just as a passenger train was passing. Five persons were injured and rail traffic
came to a standstill. Authorities suspected Kashmiri extremists.
Russia - September 9, 1997 - Bomb threat on Moscow Metro
An anonymous caller informed authorities that a mine had been placed in the
Komsomolskaya Metro station. Police searched the station and found an
inactive grenade.
Venezuela - September 9, 1997 - Explosive device in Caracas subway
station
Police discovered a small explosive charge and propaganda leaflets. After
isolating the material, authorities were able to defuse the charge.
Egypt - September 18, 1997 - Moslem fanatics attack tourist bus in Cairo
Three assailants threw hand grenades and fire bombs at a tourist bus in front of
the Egyptian museum in Cairo. The attack killed nine German tourists and
wounded 19 others.
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Germany - September 20, 1997 - Antinuclear protestors sabotage railway
Approximately 300 antinuclear demonstrators set fire to a stretch of railway
near the Kruemmel atomic energy plant in northern Germany. Police dispersed
the crowd and put out the fires before serious damage was done.
India - September 22, 1997 - Tribesmen kill 15 rival tribe members on bus
Kuki tribe members stopped a bus at Nungdolan in the northeast state of
Manipur and shot 15 Naga tribe members. The two tribes have been fighting
over control of a road leading to Myanmar that is used to smuggle more than
$1 billion in drugs each year.
Georgia - September 28, 1997 - Bomb explodes on passenger train
A bomb exploded on a train about to depart for Tbilisi from Zugdidi, injuring
one passenger. Another bomb exploded in the town’s marketplace. No one
claimed responsibility.
Honduras - September 29, 1997 - Grenade thrown at bus
Unknown assailants threw a grenade at a bus near a police station in San Pedro
Sula; the blast injured seven nurses.
India - October 1, 1997 - Three bombs on train
Unknown attackers, probably Punjabi or Kashmiri separatists, set off three
bombs on a train from New Delhi to Amritsar, killing two people and injuring
30 others.
Turkey - October 3, 1997 - PKK rebels kidnap bus passengers
Members of the rebel Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) kidnapped eight
civilians from a bus stopped at a roadblock in southeast Turkey. Two were
released hours later, but six were held by the attackers.
Uganda - October 3, 1997 - Rebels ambush bus
Rebels from the Lord’s Resistance Army ambushed a bus north of Kampala;
the attack resulted in eight deaths.
Israel - October 5, 1997 - Bomb on Tel Aviv bus
A small bomb exploded on a Tel Aviv bus. Passengers evacuated the bus
before the bomb went off, thanks to an observant passenger who witnessed an
individual place an object in a trash bin on the bus and then flee the scene.
There were no injuries.
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India - October 10, 1997 - Indian gang leader kidnaps six from tour bus
Veerapan, a notorious gang leader in southern India, kidnapped six passengers
from a tourist bus.
Algeria - October 11, 1997 - Muslim rebels kill bus passengers
In one of the worst massacres in the Oran region of Algeria, Muslim extremists
killed between 33 and 50 bus passengers at a roadblock approximately 200
miles west of Algiers; 20 motorists were also injured in the attack.
Tajkistan - November 14, 1997 - Bomb destroys railroad tracks on bridge
An explosion occurred in the center of Dushanbe, the capital of Tajkistan.
Miraculously, there were no casualties. The city had been plagued by a series
of bombings since September.
India - December 6, 1997 - Three bombs on trains kill 11
Members of the previously unheard-of “Islamic Defense Force” claimed
responsibility for a series of bombings on passenger trains in Tamil Nadu. Two
simultaneous blasts killed six people and injured 15. The third bomb killed five
and injured 39 persons.
Japan - December 18, 1997 - Tear gas on commuter train
A gang of pickpockets sprayed tear gas in a commuter coach, injuring 65
persons; 11 passengers and two undercover policemen were hospitalized. The
gang was observed stealing a purse and when police moved in on them, they
sprayed the gas to create confusion. Fearing it was another sarin attack similar
to that which occurred in 1995, passengers panicked. Four of the thieves
escaped; one was arrested by local authorities.
Guatemala - December 15, 1997 - Bandits attack tourist bus
Six armed men forced a bus off the road and drove it to a remote area, where
the passengers were tied up and robbed.
Guatemala - December 17, 1997 - Gunmen rob tourist bus
Several passengers, including three Americans, were robbed at gunpoint near
Zacapa after their vehicle was forced off the road.
Germany - December 23, 1997 - Neo-Nazis beat Chinese passenger on
Berlin train
Ten assailants severely beat their victim before disembarking the train at
Schoenholz Station. They were later apprehended.
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India - December 23, 1997 - Naga tribesmen attack bus
Naga tribesmen in India attacked a bus carrying rival Kuki tribe members,
killing 10 persons. The two tribes continue to battle for control of illegal drug
traffic on the highway.
Georgia - December 27, 1997 - Bomb extortion against subway stations
An extortionist threatened to blow up several subway stations, where he
claimed to have planted explosives, unless paid a ransom. He was arrested and
no bombs were found.
India - December 30, 1997 - Bomb on bus kills four
Four persons were killed and 24 injured when a bomb exploded on a crowded
bus in New Delhi. No group claimed responsibility for the action.
Turkey - December 30, 1997 - Bomb on commuter train injures six
A bomb placed under the seat went off at the Bakirkoy Station during rush
hour. Authorities had received warnings of possible attacks during the New
Year celebrations.
Russia - January 1, 1998 - Bomb injures three in subway station
A bomb exploded at the Tretyakovskaya Metro Station in Moscow, injuring
three subway employees. No one claimed responsibility.
Russia - January 12, 1998 - Gunmen open fire on tram
One person was killed and three others wounded when gunmen opened fire on
a crowded tram in Moscow. There had been two other shooting incidents in the
same area in the previous 36 hours. Police suspected the shootings were part of
a showdown between two organized criminal gangs.
Belgium - January 15, 1998 - Bomb injures five near central train station
A bomb exploded at a café near Antwerp’s central train station, wounding five
persons. Police believe the attack was connected with organized crime.
Guatemala - January 16, 1998 - Tourist bus ambush
Gunmen ambushed a bus carrying 16 U.S. college students and staff. The
assailants forced the bus to drive to a sugarcane field where they robbed all the
victims and raped five women. The suspects were eventually arrested; they
included two former members of the army. In 1997, there had been four bus
hijackings involving U.S. citizens in Guatemala.
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Algeria - January 20, 1998 - Bomb on bus
A bomb exploded on a bus in Algiers, killing four persons and injuring 22
others.
Japan - January 22, 1998 - Bus hijacked in Nagasaki
A man angry at local police boarded a bus, poured kerosene over a passenger,
and threatened to light her on fire if the driver did not take him to a police
station in the city. The driver drove through rush hour traffic for 30 minutes
before pulling off to the side of the road, where police boarded the bus and
persuaded the man to surrender.
Pakistan - January 28, 1998 - Bomb on bus kills one
A bomb exploded on a bus near Lahore, killing one and injuring 16 others. It
was the fourth bomb attack in the Lahore area in one week.
Brazil - February 4, 1998 - Armed robbers attack tourist train
A gang of armed thieves ambushed the train carrying tourists from Rio to the
mountaintop statue of Christ the Redeemer. Thirty-four of the 85 passengers
were robbed at gunpoint. No one was injured.
United Kingdom - February 5, 1998 - Bomb explodes at west London bus
stop
A small bomb was detonated at a west London bus stop, injuring no one.
Police suspected that the event might be linked to the so-called “Mardi Gras
[sic]” bomber, believed responsible for dozens of small bombings since 1994.
The assaults were part of an extortion scheme directed against Barclays Bank
and Sainsbury grocery stores. This bomb was 350 yards away from a
Sainsbury store previously targeted by the bomber, who got the label from the
phrase in his first extortion letter, “Welcome to the Mardi Gras.”
China - February 14, 1998 - Bomb on bus kills 16
Sixteen persons were killed and 30 others were injured when a bomb exploded
aboard a bus in the city of Wuhan.
Algeria - February 23, 1998 - Bomb kills 18 on commuter train
A bomb detonated on a commuter train in Algiers, killing 18 and wounding 25
others. It was part of a wave of bombings in the capital city.
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India - February 23, 1998 - Land mine kills five on bus
A bus carrying security personnel from election duty struck a land mine in the
state of Andhra Pradesh, killing five and wounding 26 others. A local radical
group called the People’s War Group was blamed for the attack.
Germany - March 3, 1998 - Antinuclear activists sabotage railway cables
German police accused antinuclear activists of sabotaging railway cables
between Hamburg and Bremen. Claw-shaped hooks attached to the overhead
cable caused a high-speed train to rip hundreds of yards of cable down, halting
all train traffic for several hours. Authorities found a note at the scene that
linked the attack to protests against the rail shipment of nuclear waste.
Sri Lanka - March 5, 1998 - Bomb on bus kills 28
At least 28 persons were killed and another 235 injured when a bomb exploded
on a bus as it traveled under a pedestrian bridge in the capital city of Colombo.
Authorities believed that the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
were responsible for the tragedy.
Algeria - March 7, 1998 - Bomb at bus station injures 12
A bomb, possibly detonated by Muslim rebels, exploded at a bus station in
Algiers, wounding 12 people.
Pakistan - March 8, 1998 - Bomb in Punjab kills 7
A bomb on an express train en route from Lahore to Quetta exploded, killing
seven persons and injuring 35 others. No one claimed responsibility.
Pakistan - March 10, 1998 - Bomb on commuter train kills 8
A bomb went off on a commuter train in Lahore, killing eight persons and
injuring 34 others. No one claimed responsibility.
Russia - March 19, 1998 - Poison gas attack threatened
A man identifying himself as a member of the Aum Shinrikyo sect, which had
a following in Russia, threatened to release gas on Moscow’s Metro on the
third anniversary of the sarin attack in Tokyo. Security was increased and the
day passed without incident.
Pakistan - March 25, 1998 - Bomb at bus depot
A bomb was detonated at a bus depot in Sukkur, in Sindh Province of Pakistan.
One person was injured.
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Pakistan - April 7, 1998 - Bomb explodes on bus
A bomb exploded on a passenger bus in Sukran 100 miles north of Karachi.
Five passengers were killed, and 20 others suffered injuries.
Italy - April 20, 1998 - Police warn women not to travel alone on trains
Following the murder of two women traveling alone on trains (both shot in the
head in bathrooms), police warned women not to travel alone on the rails.
Police believed that the murderer may have been linked to the deaths of six
prostitutes in the same region during the previous year. Police later arrested a
suspect in the eight murders.
India - April 24, 2998 - Four on bus kidnapped
Tribal separatists in the state of Tripura in northeastern India stopped a bus,
robbed all the passengers, and took the driver and three passengers hostage.
The area has been known for ransom kidnappings.
Colombia - April 28, 1998 - Guerrillas murder 17 on bus
Guerrillas, possibly belonging to Colombia’s paramilitary forces, halted a bus
in the Department of Antioquia, ordered passengers to lie face down, and
killed at least 17 of them. Some victims were shot as many as 18 times.
Japan - May 1, 1998 - Unidentified saboteurs strike high-speed bullet train
tracks
Saboteurs removed 25 bolts from train tracks which, if undiscovered, would
have resulted in a derailment with heavy casualties. Rail employees discovered
the sabotage before the morning trains began their routes. On the same day,
stationmasters across the country received letters threatening derailments that
would kill as many as 10,000 people. Police suspected members of Kakumaru-
ha, a leftist group active in the 1960s.
Belize - May 2, 1998 - Armed bandits halt buses
Three buses were halted by gunmen who staged a false accident on an isolated
section of a main highway running through the country. Passengers were
forced off the bus and ordered to lie face down in a field. Police arrived and a
shootout resulted in four injuries.
China - May 8, 1998 - Explosion on bus kills 12
An explosion on a bus in Anhui province killed 12 and injured 14 others.
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Colombia - May 25, 1998 - Guerrillas block vehicles
Guerrillas belonging to the National Liberation Army (ELN) blocked
transportation routes in Antioquia Department. Local bus companies
suspended service for fear of attack.
India - June 5, 1998 - Separatists blow up bridge
Brodo tribal separatists blew up a national highway bridge in Assam State. The
same group had attacked three other bridges along the same route earlier in the
week.
India - June 24, 1998 - Assam separatists detonate bomb in railway station
Calcutta and the neighboring state of Sikkim were placed on alert following a
bomb explosion at a railway station 375 miles north of the city. The United
Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) claimed responsibility for the attack, which
killed nine and injured more than 80. The same group was responsible for a
bombing at the main railway station in the capital of Assam in August 1997.
India - June 25, 1998 - Train derailed in Kashmir
Kashmiri separatists detonated a bomb on a railway track, injuring 23 people
and derailing seven cars.
China - July 9, 1998 - Police arrest train robbers
The South China Morning Post reported on July 9 that police in Wuhan
province had arrested four people in June for offering passengers drugged food
and beverages. Thieves would rob their victims when they fell unconscious
from the drugs.
Nigeria - July 11, 1998 - Armed robbers kill 10 on luxury buses
Thirty armed robbers attacked five luxury buses traveling in northeastern
Nigeria, killing 10 and injuring several others. Such attacks are common in
rural Nigeria.
India - July 26, 1998 - Bomb kills two at bus station
Two people were killed and five others were injured when a bomb exploded at
the Maharana Bus Station in New Delhi. Terrorists were suspected.
Germany - July 27, 1998 - Bomb threats disrupt Deutsche-Bahn service
Police arrested a disabled pensioner who they believed responsible for up to 20
bomb threats against trains at stations in Munich, Augsburg, Regensburg,
Stuttgart, and Ulm, which had forced the evacuation of several trains. No
bombs were ever found.
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Bosnia - July 28, 1998 - Bomb explodes on Sarajevo trolley
An explosion caused property damage but no casualties. No motive for the
attack was ever determined.
Russia - August 10, 1998 - Terrorists attack bus in Dagestan
An attack by an armed gang of terrorists appeared to be a robbery attempt.
Four passengers were wounded.
Uganda - August 25, 1998 - Grenade on bus kills 30
A hand grenade exploded on a crowded bus en route to Kigali, Rwanda, killing
30 people. The rebel Allied Democratic Forces were believed to be responsible
for the attack.
Russia - September 19, 1998 - Bomb threat at St. Petersburg railway
station
Police evacuated the immediate area following a telephone call in which an
unknown individual alleged that a bomb had been planted at the Moskovsky
Station. No bomb was found.
Georgia - September 21, 1998 - U.N. bus ambushed
An assault on a United Nations bus took place in Sukhumi. There were no
fatalities, but several U.N. personnel were injured. The activity was one of
several attacks in the Abkhazia region.
Israel - September 24, 1998 - Bomb explodes at Jerusalem bus station
One person was injured when a bomb went off at a bus station near Hebrew
University.
Congo - September 28, 1998 - Several killed at rail station
Local militiamen were believed responsible for several attacks along the
Congo-Ocean railway line. This attack, in which several died, occurred at the
Goma Tsese Station near Brazzaville, resulting in a suspension of rail service.
Senegal - October 12, 1998 - Rebels kill four on bus
Four people died and four others were wounded when members of the
Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance attacked a bus in the Sehihou
district of Casamance.
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Israel - October 29, 1998 - Two die in suicide car bomb attack on school
bus
Two died and six others were injured in a suicide mission. The driver, who
died in the explosion, rammed an army jeep escorting the bus—a security
routine in Israel. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.
Philippines - November 2, 1998 - Bombs on two buses kill one
Two bomb attacks were carried out by gangs in Mindinao trying to extort
money from local bus companies. One individual died and 40 others were
injured.
Turkey - November 7, 1998 - Terrorists kill one in attack on bus
Several unidentified attackers set a bus on fire, killing one person; several
passengers were robbed.
Italy - November 10, 1998 - Terrorist threatens Milan metro, train
stations, and airport
Police increased security after receiving an anonymous threat that there would
be a terrorist strike. The threat was made by anarchists, although authorities
believed other actors could be responsible as well.
Colombia - November 10, 1998 - Guerrillas dynamite railroad track
Members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dynamited
the rails linking the departments of El Cesar and Magdalena. This was the
second bombing of the track in 1998.
Mexico - November 10, 1998 - Gunmen attack train, killing one
A Swiss tourist was murdered and three Italian tourists were wounded when 10
gunmen attacked a passenger train in the state of Chihuahua. The Swiss citizen
was killed when he attempted to take photos of the bandits and resisted their
attempts to destroy the camera.
India - November 16, 1998 - Bomb blast wounds 25 at bus terminal
An explosion occurred in the town of Kaithel, northwest of New Delhi. No one
claimed responsibility.
China - November 16, 1998 - Attack on a tourist van in Macau
Two motorcyclists firebombed the van, which authorities believed was owned
by a local organized crime figure.
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Senegal - November 16, 1998 - Separatist rebels kill one in attack on bus
Five others were wounded in the attack, which occurred in the southern
province of Casamance. This was one of a growing number of attacks on
public transportation in the region.
Philippines - November 19, 1998 - Bomb on bus kills driver, wounds 20
One bomb exploded on a bus in Dipolog City on the island of Mindinao;
another went off at a bus terminal in Plaridel. Authorities believed that the
attacks were part of an ongoing extortion effort, given the attacks that occurred
on November 2, 1998, in the same region.
Iran - November 21, 1998 - U.S. tourists attacked
Members of Fedayeen Islam attacked a bus carrying visiting U.S. businessmen
and their wives in northern Iran. There were no serious injuries. The visitors
had been invited to Iran by the government, but hard-line newspapers, opposed
to rapprochement with the United States, described them as CIA agents posing
as tourists.
Philippines - December 7, 1998 - Another bus bomb kills one in Mindinao
In a continuing extortion campaign, a bomb explosion on a bus killed one
person and injured 11 others. This was the tenth bombing in the previous two
months, the total of which took six lives.
Philippines - December 13, 1998 - Another bus attack kills three
Continuing the torrid series of attacks in the region, a gang of 20 men fired on
a jeepney in Cotabato in the southern Philippines. Three people died and
sixteen others were injured.
Germany - December 18-19, 1998 - Three rail sabotage incidents
On December 18, a train derailed after tracks were tampered with. On
December 19, a train nearly derailed after hitting concrete blocks placed on the
tracks; another train crashed into trees lying across the rails. Germany’s
national rail system Deutsche Bahn reported that the company had received
four extortion letters from “Friends of the Railways” demanding a payment of
$6 million. Police used air force planes equipped with infrared cameras for
night surveillance to ensure passenger safety.
Mexico - February 10, 1999 - Armed gang terrorizes police buses
Mexico City police launched an intensive search to capture members of an
armed gang that had been targeting public buses known as peseros. Typically,
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three or four men would board a bus, force the driver to leave his route, tie up
and rob the passengers, rape one or two of the women, then escape.
Sri Lanka - March 9, 1999 - Terrorists bombs kill one on bus, hit other
transportation targets
A bomb killed one person and injured 12 others. Another bomb detonated on a
train in a rail yard. Authorities assigned responsibility to the separatist Tamil
Tigers (LTTE).
Turkey - March 12, 1999 - Firebomb thrown at city bus
There were no casualties from firebombs that were thrown by unidentified
people at various targets in Istanbul, including a city bus.
Sri Lanka - March 17, 1999 - Bomb found on rail line
A fire and a half-pound bomb were discovered on a rail line in Colombo just
minutes before the beginning of the morning rush hour. Police authorities
suspected the separatist Tamil Tigers (LTTE). On March 16, a suicide attack
claimed four lives in Colombo.
Guatemala - April 5, 1999 - Armed attackers set fire to buses
A group of four armed men carried out three attacks on buses in Guatemala
City, robbing drivers and passengers and then setting the buses on fire before
their escape.
Sri Lanka - April 11, 1999 - Bomb kills two on bus
A young ethnic Tamil woman placed a bomb on a bus in Kandy, which
exploded shortly after she stepped off the bus. The explosion killed two and
injured 20.
China - April 29, 1999 - Two executed for bombing railway
Two low-ranking officials in Hebei province were executed for bombing a
railway. They said they wanted to “get back at society.”
Nicaragua - May 15, 1999 - Armed gang kill two motorists
An armed gang carried out a series of attacks on vehicles traveling east of
Managua, killing two people. One of the attackers was later killed by police,
and two others were captured.
Georgia - June 23, 1999 - Mine kills three on bus
Three people died and thirteen others were injured when a bus hit an antitank
mine that had been planted on the road in the Abkhazia region.
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Australia - July 6, 1999 - Bomb explodes at commuter railway station
A bomb explosion that occurred during the afternoon rush hour in the western
part of Sydney injured three persons. Police apprehended a 16-year-old boy
believed responsible for the attack. His motive was unknown.
Greece - July 13, 1999 - Bus passengers held hostage for two days
An angry, emotionally distraught Albanian immigrant seized 50 hostages
aboard a bus near Thesaloniki. He demanded two pistols, $780,000 in cash,
and safe passage to Albania. Police negotiated with the man for two days,
winning the release of all but five hostages. On July 15, they stormed the
vehicle and killed the hostage-taker.
Pakistan - July 27, 1999 - Bomb kills seven on bus in Kashmir
Seven passengers died and nineteen others were injured when a bomb
exploded on a bus in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Pakistani authorities
blamed the bombing on Indian agents.
India - August 7, 1999 - Bomb damages bridge just ahead of passenger
train
A bomb damaged a bridge span, making it unusable for train traffic. An
approaching train with more than a thousand passengers stopped before
traveling over the damaged span. No one was injured. Authorities suspect the
separatist United Liberation Front of Assam.
India - August 9, 1999 - Bomb derails train in northeast
An explosion derailed a freight train, causing five injuries.
India - August 16, 1999 - Explosives found at railway station
Railway police found more than 30 pounds of ammonium nitrate in fuel oil
(ANFO) on the platform of a busy train station in Calcutta. Authorities
believed that the explosives were being transferred to Kashmir by Pakistani
agents.
Russia - August 17, 1999 - Attempted bombing of passenger train
An unidentified man tried to board a train in the North Caucasus with a large
fragmentation bomb. He was stopped and no one was injured.
Philippines - August (NA), 1999 - Two bombs exploded on buses
Two bombs exploded on buses belonging to the Weena Express Company in
Davao on the island of Mindinao. Extortionists were believed responsible for
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the activities. These were the sixth and seventh attacks on the company,
leading police to step up monitoring of major bus stops.
Philippines - September 4, 1999 - Grenade kills two at bus terminal
An unidentified man threw a grenade near a bus terminal in Zamboanga del
Sur on the island of Mindinao. The explosion killed two and injured two
others.
Philippines - September 20, 1999 - Communist rebels hijack bus
Rebels operating on Mindinao hijacked a bus, forced passengers off, and set
the bus on fire. There were no injuries. Both communist rebels and Muslim
separatists have long histories of extorting payments from transportation
companies in the Mindinao region.
Philippines - September 21, 1999 - Bomb kills four on bus
As part of an apparent continuous campaign of violence aimed at extortion,
terrorists set off a bomb. The blast killed four and injured dozens of others.
Authorities blamed this action on Muslim separatists.
Sri Lanka - September 26, 1999 - Bomb kills one on bus
A bomb explosion killed one person and injured 28 others in Badulla, 85 miles
east of Colombo. Tamil Tigers (LTTE) were believed responsible.
Brazil - October 20, 1999 - Bomb explodes on commuter train in Sao
Paulo
A bomb explosion on a commuter train injured seven persons. No one claimed
responsibility.
Israel - October 30, 1999 - Attackers open fire on bus
Five Israeli passengers were injured when suspected Palestinian attackers
opened fire on a bus traveling in the West Bank.
Pakistan - November 4, 1999 - Bombs kill one
Three bombs exploded in the town of Muridke, north of Lahore. One device
exploded at a bus stand, another near the railway station, and a third at a hotel.
One person was killed and three others were injured. Some 150,000 people had
assembled in the town for the annual meeting of an Islamic militant group that
has been fighting for Kashmir independence.
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Brazil - November 9, 1999 - Assailants kill tourist in Rio taxi
A French couple were lured to a gypsy cab at the airport. Once inside, they
were robbed and the wife killed. Such crimes are common in both Brazil and
Mexico.
India - November 11, 1999 - Thirteen killed in bomb explosion on train
Thirteen people died and fifty others were injured when a device detonated on
an express train traveling from Jammu in Kashmir to New Delhi.
Togo - November 22, 1999 - Bandits attack bus, kill one
Bandits attacked two buses near the Togo-Benin border, killing one person and
injuring several others. Ten women were also raped.
Pakistan - November 29, 1999 - Two killed in bomb on bus
Two people were killed and nine others injured when a bomb exploded on a
bus in Hyderabad. A group supporting ousted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
claimed responsibility. The same group detonated a bomb in Lahore on
November 20, killing eight.
Argentina - November 30, 1999 - Airport bus passengers robbed
Three gunmen posing as passengers robbed 35 passengers aboard a bus after it
left the Buenos Aires Ezeiza Airport. They then jumped into a van that had
been following the bus. There were no injuries.
Pakistan - December 1, 1999 - 15-pound bomb found on main track
A device was discovered by an employee at the Kotri railway station in
Hyderabad. It was set to go off later that morning. Police defused the bomb and
there were no injuries.
Russia - December 15, 1999 - Two men commandeer bus in Moscow
Two gunmen boarded the bus posing as shoppers and threatened passengers
with guns and hand grenades. After robbing the passengers, the assailants fled
to a waiting vehicle.
Israel - December 24, 1999 - Pipe bomb explodes at bus station
A bomb went off at the central bus station in the City of Netanya. There were
no injuries.
Japan - December 24, 1999 - Bomb found in trash bag on bullet train
A device was found hidden in a trash bag that had been on the train. The bomb
exploded in a train yard in Osaka after it was removed from the train.
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Japan - December 26, 1999 - Fires on three trains to Narita
Three deliberately started fires broke out on the express trains that run between
Tokyo and Narita airport. Police suspected that the arson was the work of
extremists opposed to the expansion of the airport.
Japan - December 27, 1999 - Bomb explodes at train station
An explosion injured one person at the Urawa train station north of Tokyo. The
device had been placed in a coin locker. Police advised railway companies to
be alert for suspicious objects.
Costa Rica - January 1, 2000 - Bandits attack bus
Bandits on horseback held up the bus near the Nicaraguan border. Police
suspected that they were former guerrillas from Nicaragua.
Philippines - January 3, 2000 - Guerrillas torch buses
Members of the communist New People’s Army set two buses on fire in South
Cotabato province on Mindinao. Passengers were ordered off the buses, but no
one was harmed. Police attributed the attack to the bus company owner’s
resistance to “revolutionary taxes.”
India - January 6, 2000 - Bomb injures 12 at rail station
A bomb in a briefcase was placed under a seat on a train at Old Delhi railway
station and exploded, injuring 12 persons. No group claimed responsibility.
Albania - January 9, 2000 - Assailants open fire on bus
Three people suffered gunshot wounds when armed robbers opened fire on a
bus in the Gjirokaster.
Philippines - January 18, 2000 - Rebels destroy buses in Mindinao
In an ongoing series of attacks to extort “revolutionary taxes” from the Weena
Bus Company in Davao and Cotabato, communist rebels blew up two buses.
There were no casualties.
India - January 19, 2000 - Bomb derails train
A freight train was derailed by a bomb explosion on a rail line in Assam State.
In related incidents, 15 pounds of explosives were found aboard a bus on
January 18 and three unexploded bombs were discovered on another rail line.
Authorities blamed the attacks on the separatist United Liberation Front for
Assam.
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Sri Lanka - January 30, 2000 - Bomb on bus injures 16
An explosion occurred on a bus bound for Colombo. Separatist Tamil Tigers
(LTTE) were believed responsible.
India - January 26, 2000 - Explosive device found on Mumbai train
A passenger found a clock left in a suburban train on the Marine Lines in
Mumbai. The passenger took the clock home. It exploded on the way, causing
minor injuries.
Yugoslavia - February 2, 2000 - Assailants fire rocket at bus, killing two
A bus carrying Serb civilians was hit by an antitank rocket. Two people died
and five were injured.
Sri Lanka - February 3, 2000 - Three bomb attacks on buses
Explosions that occurred near Colombo injured 30 people.
Pakistan - February 6, 2000 - Bomb on train kills five
An explosion occurred on the coach of a passenger train just after it left
Hyderabad Station; 44 persons were injured.
Sri Lanka - February 7, 2000 - Bus bombings injure 37
In a continuing terrorist campaign probably carried out by the separatist Tamil
Tigers (LTTE), two bombs exploded on buses in the Monogaral area,
wounding 37 people.
Sri Lanka - February 8, 2000 - Two bus bombings kill three
Two people were killed and 47 others injured in bus bombings. One bomb
exploded just as passengers were boarding an intercity bus in Colombo. The
second occurred on a bus just north of the capital. Tamil Tigers (LTTE) were
believed responsible.
Algeria - February 14, 2000 - Islamic rebels kill 16 bus passengers
Assailants opened fire on passengers of two buses at a fake roadblock. Sixteen
people died and 30 others were injured.
Senegal - February 20, 2000 - Rebels kill four on tourist buses
Casamance separatists attacked two tour buses 150 miles south of Dakar,
killing four and injuring 20 foreign tourists. This was the first attack on tourists
by the separatist group.
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Philippines - March 15, 2000 - Bomb on bus injures five
An explosion occurred on a bus in a passenger terminal in the town of Matalam
on the island of Mindinao, continuing a pattern of violence.
Poland - March 18, 2000 - Tourist bus robbed
A bus was flagged down on a remote stretch of highway by a vehicle with
flashing red lights. Five masked and armed men boarded the vehicle and
robbed the passengers.
India - March 21, 2000 - Bomb injures four on commuter train
An explosion occurred aboard a local commuter train in Mumbai (Bombay).
The device was a metal pipe filled with gunpowder and linked to a timer.
Police suspected that the attack was intended to spread panic on the eve of
President Clinton’s visit to India, given that the explosion happened near the
area where Clinton was scheduled to stay.
Brazil - March 28, 2000 - Angry commuters set fire to train
Angered by interrupted service, commuters set fire to the commuter train after
it broke down on the outskirts of Sao Paulo. There was extensive damage but
no injures.
Pakistan - April 7, 2000 - Bomb at bus station injures 15
A bomb exploded in Lahore’s main bus station, injuring 15 people.
Colombia - April 16, 2000 - Paramilitary gunmen kidnap bus passengers,
kill four
Gunmen blocked a bus in Antioquia department and kidnapped 15 passengers.
Four of them were shot near the scene; the other 11 disappeared.
Belgium - April 18, 2000 - Three boys cause trains to derail, killing one
One person died and 22 others were injured as a result of an intentional train
derailment. Three boys (aged 8, 9, and 13) were arrested by police for causing
the incident.
Guatemala - April 25, 2000 - Rioters destroy city buses
Protests against fare increases turned violent when demonstrators, mostly
university students, began attacking and burning buses throughout the city.
Ecuador - April 27, 2000 - Rioters attack buses in Quito
Protesting against the pegging of Ecuador’s currency to the U.S. dollar,
students attacked buses throughout Quito.
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Japan - May 3, 2000 - One person killed in bus hijacking
A 17-year old boy armed with a knife hijacked an express bus on the Island of
Kyushu. Two women were stabbed and one later died. Police halted the
vehicle after a four-hour chase. The motive appeared to have been personal.
Russia - May 3, 2000 - Bomb threats delay trains in St. Petersburg
An anonymous bomb threat delayed the departure of several trains carrying
World War II veterans on their way to ceremonies in Moscow to
commemorate the end of the war.
Algeria - May 3, 2000 - Islamic extremists kill 19 on bus
An attack by extremists resulted in the deaths of 19 passengers. The attack
occurred after the terrorists stopped the bus at a fake roadblock 50 miles south
of Algiers.
Indonesia - May 25, 2000 - Protesters attack bus
Student protesters attacked and set fire to a bus in Jakarta; they also burned
other vehicles as part of their violent protest activities.
South Africa - June 1, 2000 - Bus drivers shot and wounded
As part of an ongoing turf war between the bus company and taxi operators,
three bus drivers were shot and wounded in Cape Town.
Laos - June 6, 2000 - Bomb blast on bus kills two
Two people died and 10 others were injured in an explosion on a bus. The
vehicle was parked near a morning market that had been the target of another
bombing 10 days earlier.
Philippines - June 7, 2000 - Bomb found on Manila Metro
An explosive device was discovered by a train operator. It was detonated on
the scene by a police bomb disposal unit. Train operations were suspended for
five hours. This seemed to be part of a wave of bombings and bomb threats that
began in Manila in May.
Colombia - June 7, 2000 - Guerrillas kill two in attack on bus
When the driver refused to stop at a checkpoint set up by rebels, they opened
fire on the bus, killing the driver and a passenger and causing the bus to crash.
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Brazil - June 12, 2000 - Hostage situation on bus ends in two deaths
A fleeing robber boarded a bus and seized six hostages. After four hours of
negotiations with the gunman, who was using a woman passenger as a shield,
police opened fire. Both the gunman and his hostage were killed.
United Kingdom - June 12, 2000 - Vandals attempt to derail high-speed
train
Maintenance equipment was deliberately placed on tracks in an apparent
attempt to derail a high-speed train near Daventry. Similar attacks using
concrete blocks and steel bars on tracks recently had caused derailments in
France and Belgium.
United Kingdom - June 13, 2000 - Vandals attack commuter train
Similar to the previous day’s activity, a commuter train was halted by concrete
blocks placed on the tracks near Coventry. When the train stopped, the driver
was pelted by rocks and several coach windows were smashed.
Sri Lanka - June 14, 2000 - Suicide bomber kills two
A suicide bomber attempted to ram his explosive-filled bicycle into a bus, but
was prevented from doing so by heavy traffic. The bomb exploded
prematurely, killing two bystanders and injuring eight others.
Pakistan - June 21, 2000 - Bomb in bus terminal kills one
A bomb exploded in Rawalpindi’s main bus terminal, killing one and injuring
nine others.
Latvia - June 23, 2000 - Group threatens a “war of the rails”
A group calling itself The Fighters of Democratic Latvia threatened a “war of
the rails” unless the government legalized the Communist Party and placed the
Russian language on an equal footing with Latvian. The threat was sent in a
letter to newspapers, in which the group also claimed responsibility for an
explosion that damaged tracks near Riga. Riga’s main train station also
received a bomb threat the previous week.
United Kingdom - June 30, 2000 - Rail line linking Belfast and Dublin
bombed
Protestant extremists were suspected of responsibility for bombing the railway
track that links the capital of Northern Ireland with that of the Irish Republic.
There were no injuries.
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Pakistan - July 7, 2000 - Bomb at bus station kills one
Near Lahore, a remote-controlled device was placed under an intercity minibus
shortly before it was scheduled to depart. One person died and four others were
injured in the blast.
Pakistan - July 16, 2000 - Bomb on train kills nine
Nine people died and 35 others were injured in a train explosion that occurred
just outside of Hyderabad. This was the second bombing of a train in
Hyderabad in 2000.
United Kingdom - July 19, 2000 - Bomb threats disrupt Underground
Responding to a coded phone call, police located and detonated a bomb placed
on the tracks of a London subway station during the morning rush hour.
Threats also were made to two other stations, but no devices were found. The
events caused police to shut down portions of the Underground for several
hours. The caller used the same code word that was used by someone prior to
the June 30 bombing of the rail line between Belfast and Dublin.
Russia - July 20, 2000 - Terrorist plots failed
On July 19, police arrested three Chechens who possessed bomb-making
materials and reportedly were planning to bomb a railway station in
Volgograd. On July 20, police in Moscow arrested a Chechen who planned to
plant a large bomb at Moscow’s Kursky railway station. They recovered
detonators, remote control mechanisms, and a significant amount of
explosives.
India - July 24, 2000 - Bomb on bus kills seven
Seven people died and 16 were injured when a bomb exploded aboard a bus in
the Jalandar, Punjab state. No one claimed responsibility.
Ukraine - July 24, 2000 - Passenger train derailed
Damaged track caused a train to derail, injuring 40. The circumstances of the
damage were not clear, and no one claimed responsibility for the incident.
Germany - July 27, 2000 - Bomb explodes at entrance to Duesseldorf
Underground
An explosion caused by a fragmentation device injured nine persons. No one
claimed responsibility for the event. However, the victims of the attack were
recent immigrants from the former Soviet Union, many of them Jewish,
suggesting that the attack was motivated by anti-Semitic or anti-foreign
sentiments.
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South Africa - July 27, 2000 - Two killed on commuter bus
A group of armed men attacked a commuter bus owned by the Golden Arrow
Company in Cape Town, killing two and injuring five others. This was part of
a series of attacks on Golden Arrow buses by illegal taxi drivers engaged in a
turf war.
India - July 31, 2000 - Bomb on passenger train kills 12
A remotely controlled device exploded on a passenger train in Assam State
west of the capital, killing 12 and injuring several others. A freight train was
blown up in same area on July 30. Authorities believed that The United
Liberation Front of Assam was responsible for the act.
Russia - August 8, 2000 - Bomb kills eight in underground passage
Eight deaths and many injuries were caused by the explosion. Chechen rebels
were believed responsible.
Colombia - August 8, 2000 - Guerillas burn buses
Guerrillas of the National Liberation Army (ELN) set up a roadblock and
burned a number of vehicles, including two buses, in Cesar department. In
Magdelena department, ELN guerrillas burned two more buses.
Russia - August 10, 2000 - Explosives found in Moscow railway station
Following an explosion in an underground passage on August 8, police found
nine pounds of TNT and seven detonators in a suitcase in the lost luggage
office of the Kazansky railway station. The device was not wired for
detonation.
India - August 14, 2000 - Bomb on train kills 10
Ten deaths and 36 injuries occurred when a device exploded on an express
train in Uttar Pradesh. Authorities speculated that the bomb was planted by
Kashmir or Assam separatists.
Pakistan - September 4, 2000 - Bomb in bus station kills two
Two people died and 12 were injured in a Lahore bus station explosion. No one
claimed responsibility.
Cote D’Ivoire - October 5, 2000 - Four killed planting bomb at bus station
Four deaths and seven injuries took place when a bomb terrorists were planting
exploded prematurely at the main bus station in the capital Abdijan. The
country was already in a state of emergency as a result of tensions caused by
the growing political instability.
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United Kingdom - October 17, 2000 - Train accident raises terrorism
concerns
A high-speed train derailed, killing four persons and injuring 35 others.
Although the incident was judged to be an accident, there were reports of
unspecified telephone threats that a bomb had been planted on a rail line north
of London.
United States - October 20, 2000 - Bomb threat halts Amtrak train
A bomb threat forced the evacuation of an Amtrak train traveling from
Washington, D.C., to Chicago. About 100 passengers were taken off and the
train was moved out of town to reduce the possibility of damage to the
community. No device was found.
India - October 26, 2000 - Bomb on passenger train kills one
One person died and at least 30 others were injured by an explosion on a train
in Punjab.
Israel - November 20, 2000 - Bombing of bus kills two
Two people were killed and nine people were injured when a bomb exploded
near the bus in which they were traveling near a settlement in the Gaza Strip.
Sri Lanka - November 28, 2000 - Land mine kills seven on bus
An explosion occurred as a civilian bus hit a mine planted on a road 100 miles
north of Colombo. Seven people died and 20 others were injured. Tamil Tigers
(LTTE) were believed to be responsible.
Sri Lanka - December 6, 2000 - Land mine kills three on bus
An explosion in the eastern part of the country killed three people and injured
more than 20 others. Tamil Tigers (LTTE) were believed to be responsible.
Georgia - December 6, 2000 - Gunmen open fire on bus
Four passengers were wounded when unidentified gunmen opened fire on a
bus traveling between Tbilisi and Istanbul. Attacks on buses in the area are not
uncommon.
Russia - December 16, 2000 - Bomb threat against Moscow metro
Police closed off portions of the Moscow metro system after receiving a
warning that a bomb was left at the Dmitrovskaya Station. No bomb was
found.
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India - December 18, 2000 - Bomb on bus kills four
Four died and fourteen others were injured when a bomb exploded on a bus in
the state of Nagaland. No one claimed responsibility, but Naga separatists were
suspected.
Algeria - December 18, 2000 - Terrorists open fire on buses, killing 20
One ambush took place on a highway near Tenes west of Algiers, resulting in
the deaths of 15 persons. Five more were killed in a similar attack in Khermis
Miliana. Authorities suspected Islamic extremists.
Thailand - December 26, 2000 - Bus hijacking ends in shoot-out
A gunmen hijacked a bus to rob passengers. After the driver alerted police at a
checkpoint, a gunfight resulted in which four passengers were injured.
Israel - December 28, 2000 - Fourteen injured in bomb explosions on bus
Two explosions occurred on a bus in Tel Aviv, wounding 14 passengers. A
previously unknown group calling itself the Saladin Brigades claimed
responsibility for the attack.
Philippines - December 30, 2000 - Bomb kills nine on metro
Five bombs rocked Manila, killing 11 and injuring more than 90 others. Most
of the casualties (nine dead and more than 60 wounded) were caused by a
bomb on a light rail transport train as it pulled into Manila’s Blumentritt
Station at noon. Police suspicion focused on the radical Abu Sayyf group,
which has been fighting for a separate Islamic nation.
Philippines - December 30, 2000 - Bomb kills one at bus terminal
Another of the five bombs described above exploded in Quezon city’s main
bus terminal, killing one and injuring 15. A third bomb exploded near a large
aviation fuel depot at Manila’s international airport, a fourth at a park bench
near the American embassy, and the fifth at a gas station across from Dusit
Hotel in Manila.
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CONCLUSIONS
That surface transportation terrorism has become an international phenomenon
is beyond dispute. The nearly 800 accounts described in two volumes of
examination testify to the extent that the practice of this abhorrent activity
extends almost everywhere. Clearly, some areas of the world are more
susceptible to such assaults than others. Just as clearly, governments differ not
only in their concern for surface transportation terrorism, but in their
approaches, preparation, and strategies.
Based on the four studies examined in this report, there well may be certain
themes that help to account for not only different assault methodologies, but
also different capabilities and different government responses. The data are by
no means conclusive. Nevertheless, there appear to be differences with respect
to historical references, cultural values, and government organizational
arrangements. An analysis of these elements helps to suggest why some
surface terrorism efforts succeed, some fail, and others never occur.
HISTORICAL REFERENCES
Some areas of the world accept surface transportation terrorism as the “cost of
doing business” to the extent that it is the easiest way for disfranchised
elements to make themselves heard in a meaningful way. Most examples along
these lines have occurred in developing societies, where the rule of law is not
necessarily accepted as legitimate by those with long-festering political
grievances. Authorities in other political systems are much less tolerant of
terrorism and keep close watch on the persons who perpetuate such activity.
Either way, surface transportation terrorism may be common because it is
relatively easy to carry out.
The voluminous accounts of assault and counterassault in India and Pakistan,
the Philippines, the Middle East, and parts of Eastern Europe reveal surface
transportation terrorism as a way of attempting to upset the status quo and, at
times, to express revolutionary fervor. Some such activity is little more than
political alienation; in other cases, such as the strikes in London, the attacks
represented the expressions of serious grievances. Rarely have perpetrators of
surface transportation terrorism sought to take lives as a primary objective,
although the work of Aum Shinrikyo in Japan would seem to stand out as an
example of such activity.
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CULTURAL VALUES
The attitudes of authorities and the general public play large roles in the
management of surface transportation terrorism and the threat—implied or
real—of such assaults. Authorities in London were vigilant about responding
to attacks on “the system.” They worked hard to foil the efforts of the Irish
Republican Army and its allies. In Tokyo, initial deference to religious and
cultural values kept authorities from moving quickly lest they offend not only
the alleged perpetrators, but also others of strong convictions.
Matters have been quite different in the two U.S. cases. Representatives from
the BART system in the San Francisco Bay area have prepared for possible
assault on some level, as shown by the cameras, HazMat suits, and “dry run,”
or simulated, chemical and/or biological events. In San Jose, the authorities
protecting the VTA have given virtually no thought to any potential incident,
choosing instead to leave any response to other law enforcement authorities,
should such ever be necessary. Ironically, the United States has been touched
by terrorism—the bombings of the World Trade Center in New York and the
Murra Federal Building in Oklahoma City stand as examples.8 Nevertheless, at
least in the BART and VTA cases, these instances have not been viewed as
signs of vulnerability as much as indications of the work of extremists; thus,
they have not been perceived by most authorities as readily replicable.
GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS
The structure of government authority may help to explain the different
response patterns to surface transportation terrorism in particular, and the
threat of terrorism in general. The police in London were given wide latitude in
the management of the IRA attacks. Similar organization in Tokyo permitted
the police there to respond in an organized fashion, although their actions were
not as quick.
In the United States, government organization is considerably more complex.
The variety of local agencies in both the BART and VTA systems suggests a
complex response pattern. For BART, the issue is unusually convoluted,
because the BART police, a separate jurisdiction, is combined with local police
authorities from a dozen or more jurisdictions. VTA is slightly less
complicated, with the San Jose Police Department and Santa Clara County
8 Note that this report’s peer review and authors’ responses were completed prior to the events
of September 11, 2001.
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Sheriff sharing responsibilities with other police jurisdictions. As long as no
attacks occur, the response problems will be theoretical. Should a real threat
come to pass, however, local authorities might be hard pressed to act with
consistency, absent an emergency declared by the governor (state intervention)
or president (National Guard intervention).
With only four cases examined in depth, it is difficult to know with certainty
whether any of the factors cited above could be decisive. However, differences
do exist and, lacking information to the contrary, it may be that one or more of
these factors has accounted, at least in part, for the different ways the issues
have been managed. One fact regarding the management of surface
transportation systems remains indisputable: Whatever the differences in
history, values, or government capabilities, surface transportation terrorism can
never be stopped altogether.
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